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ARTICLE
GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION
AND BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS:
THE CARROT AND THE STICK
M. BENJAMIN EICHENBERG

―Some say the world will end in fire,
Some say in ice.
From what I‘ve tasted of desire
I hold with those who favor fire.
But if it had to perish twice,
I think I know enough of hate
To say that for destruction ice
Is also great
And would suffice.‖1



Ben Eichenberg obtained his JD from UC Hastings in 2008 and has spent the last year as a
Fulbright Fellow at the Law School of the University of Oslo, where he just finished his Master‟s
degree in Public International Law—this Article originated as a Master‟s thesis for that program. In
February of 2010, Ben will present this work at the Public Interest Environmental Law Conference
in Eugene, Oregon. Ben would like to thank his thesis advisor, Christina Voigt, for her wisdom and
guidance; his Norwegian family, the Steens, and Brook Steens for taking him in and making him
welcome in their lives; his father, Tim Eichenberg, for the inspiration; Professor Rory Little for the
thorough edit and comments; all of his Oslo friends; his son Leo for being; the Fulbright Foundation;
the University of Oslo; and, most of all, his wife Susie Meserve without whom . . .
1
ROBERT FROST, FIRE AND ICE, reprinted in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST, at 220
(Edward Lathem, ed., Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 1969) (1923).

283

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001

1

Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 3
03_B. EICHENBERG PRINTER VERSION

284

5/22/2010 11:27 AM

GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J.

[Vol. 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

II.

INTRODUCTION: BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF
ANTHROPOGENIC GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
A. A RELATIVELY BRIEF OVERVIEW OF REGULATORY THEORY AS
IT RELATES TO CLIMATE ISSUES, GREENHOUSE GASES, AND
BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS
i. Domestic Regulatory Pressures and Trends and the Role
That Border Tax Adjustment Could Play
ii. GHG Taxes, Especially Carbon Taxes, and the Role That
Border Tax Adjustment Could Play
B. A RELATIVELY BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE EQUITABLE ISSUES
UNDERLYING THE CLIMATE CRISIS
C. THE UNFCCC AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
D. DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS: WHY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
NEED TO EMIT CARBON AND THE PRESSING NEED TO ADDRESS
GHG OUTPUT FROM DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, AND BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENT
A. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
B. BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENT UNDER THE LAW OF THE WTO
i. BTAs for Exported Products
ii. BTAs for Imported Products
C. GATT JURISPRUDENCE CONCERNING “LIKE” PRODUCT
ANALYSIS
i. Environmental Process and Production Methods
D. GATT ARTICLE XX EXCEPTIONS
i. GATT Article XX(b)
ii. GATT Article XX(g)
iii. The Chapeau of GATT Article XX
E. QUALIFYING A GREEN HOUSE-GAS-BASED BTA UNDER AN
ARTICLE XX EXCEPTION
i. GreenHousehouse-Gas-Based BTAs and Article XX(b)
Exceptions
ii. GreenHousehouse-Gas-Based BTAs and Article XX(g)
Exceptions
iii. GreenHousehouse-Gas-Based BTAs and the Chapeau of
Article XX

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol3/iss2/3

2

Eichenberg: Greenhouse Gas Regulation
03_B. EICHENBERG PRINTER VERSION

5/22/2010 11:27 AM

2010] GREENHOUSE GASES AND BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS 285
III. PLANNED BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS RELATED TO GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSIONS
A. SOME PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS
FOR GREENHOUSE GASES
B. A PROPOSAL FOR AN ECONOMICALLY FEASIBLE BORDER TAX
ADJUSTMENT
C. THE “COMPETITIVENESS PROVISION” IN PROPOSED CLIMATE
LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES
D. POTENTIAL WEAKENING EFFECTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION FROM BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS
IV. THE RESULT OF BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS: THE STICK
A. HARMONIZATION THROUGH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS AND BOTTOM-UP
CLIMATE REGIMES
V. CONCLUSION

Border Tax Adjustment (BTA): for imports, a BTA means a tax on
goods entering domestic markets from abroad to balance tax burdens
already imposed on domestic producers; for exports, a BTA means the
remission of taxes usually imposed on domestic producers as a means of
protecting the international competitiveness of such producers where
their goods are solely destined for export to other counties.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001

3

Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 3
03_B. EICHENBERG PRINTER VERSION

286
I.

5/22/2010 11:27 AM

GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J.

[Vol. 3

INTRODUCTION: BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF
ANTHROPOGENIC GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE

Global climate change due to the emission of anthropogenic, or
manmade, greenhouse gases (GHGs) has the most widely dispersed costs
of any transboundary environmental problem that the international
community has yet faced. In other words, it is a global public problem
and thus provides few incentives for unilateral or individual mitigation.2
This makes finding solutions difficult because international coalitions
must face the problem of free-riders who benefit from reduced GHG
concentrations at zero cost3—those who make the economically rational
decision to let others reduce atmospheric GHG concentrations while they
continue to build GHG-intensive economies. Free-riders contribute to a
multitude of problems for international environmental agreements in
general, and climate agreements in particular, by impacting the
competitiveness of exports, raising equity issues between trading
partners, and negatively affecting the overall effectiveness of
environmental protection schemes generally and GHG emissions targets
in particular. The basic incentives that encourage free-riding need to be
addressed before global climate governance can become a reality.
Finding and implementing economic solutions to the problems of
global climate governance is one of the few efficient and effective
problem-solving methodologies currently available. Economic power in
general affects the positions of states in multilateral or bilateral
environmental negotiations and can have a profound impact on the
outcomes of such agreements, whereas military power rarely has much
impact or influence on outcomes.4 Furthermore, much of the root causes
of anthropogenic climate change occur as a result of economic
development and markets that fail to properly encourage sustainable
development—sustainable natural resource use is systematically

2

DAVID KERNOHAN & ENRICA DE CIAN, Trade, the Environment and Climate Change:
Multilateral Versus Regional Agreements, in CLIMATE AND TRADE POLICY: BOTTOM-UP
APPROACHES TOWARD GLOBAL AGREEMENT 70, 75 (Carlo Carraro & Christian Egenhofer eds.,
2007) (“Climate protection can be viewed as a global „public good‟ which means that there are few
incentives for unilateral mitigation . . . Hence, in order to be effective, climate change mitigation
requires a global-cooperative solution.”).
3
Id. “Free-riders” are actors who “benefit from having cleaner air at zero cost.” Id.
4
For instance, “Japan and the Republic of Korea have accepted international agreements on
drift-netting and whaling because they feared the loss of fishing benefits from the United States. And
Japan succeeded in ensuring the support of some small nonwhaling nations for its prowhaling
position by offering assistance to their fishing industries.” GARETH PORTER, JANET WELSH BROWN,
& PAMELA S. CHASEK, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 11 (2000).
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undervalued in modern market economies.5 Likewise, environmental
services, restorative ecosystem functions like water purification and
flood control in wetlands, are utilized in irresponsible and unsustainable
ways because economic markets fail to properly value such services.6
According to Porter, Brown & Chasek,
One of the obstacles to effective international action for environmental
conservation in the past has been a dominant social paradigm that
justifies unlimited exploitation of nature. Despite the weakening of
that paradigm and the apparent widespread recognition of an
alternative sustainable development paradigm . . . the shift to this
alternative social paradigm is far from complete. There are still some
sectors of societies, particularly powerful political and economic
institutions, where the traditional paradigm continues to exhibit
7
extraordinary staying power.

It is only rational to address a solution through the same economic
channels that caused anthropogenic climate change in the first place.
Currently, most economies do not account for climate-changeassociated costs incurred by GHG emissions.8 Accounting for GHG
emissions increases systemic economic efficiency by incorporating
climate externalities and allowing market forces to perform regulatory
functions, pushing economic actors to take into account the full costs of
production.9 Methods to address climate externalities are being
considered or implemented in various places around the world and
include GHG allowances, GHG permit trading schemes, and
environmental taxes. Some of these measures have been considered or
implemented in order to fulfill international obligations incurred under
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC)10 and its accompanying Kyoto Protocol.11 Uncertainty about
the future costs of such programs causes hesitation on the part of

5

Id. at 24.
Id.
7
Id. at 32.
8
Roland Ismer & Karsten Neuhoff, Border Tax Adjustment: A Feasible Way To Support
Stringent Emission Trading, 24 EUR. J. LAW ECON. 137, 141 (2007).
9
David G. Duff, Tax Policy and Global Warming, 51 CANADIAN TAX J. 2063, 2069 (2003),
available at www.ctf.ca/ctjindex/03ctj6.asp.
10
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, available at
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/2853.php [hereinafter
UNFCCC].
11
Kyoto Protocol to the United National Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
11, 1997, available at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.
6
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regulators and instigates intensive lobbying by potentially affected
industries, directly impacting the efficacy of GHG cost internalization
measures.12 Countries that have begun Kyoto implementation are
especially sensitive to disparities between their own GHG reduction
commitments and the lack of such commitments from non-Kyoto
signatories.13 Domestic businesses in many of the countries that have
shown a commitment to reduce their GHG emissions are urging
measures to ease competitive pressures from international competition
with non-GHG regulated products.14
One solution to such disparities in GHG reduction commitments is
for GHG-regulating states to use Border Tax Adjustments (BTAs) to
protect domestic industries. BTAs in this context would tax imports to
balance the costs faced by domestic producers for GHG regulations and
would relieve exports of the costs of GHG-based domestic regulation. As
pointed out by Gavin Goh, “[i]n the absence of harmonized domestic tax
systems among trading partners, an objective of border tax adjustments is
to ensure trade neutrality of domestic taxation and thereby preserve
competitive equality between domestic and imported goods.”15 The most
significant obstacles to the use of BTAs are typically posed by free-trade
agreements—and by far the most relevant restrictions to the use of BTAs
come from the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Global
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).16,17 The goal of this Article is
to show not only that is there room for BTAs as a complement to
domestic GHG regulation under the law of the WTO, but that BTAs are a
necessary component in the construction of a system of global climate
governance.
BTAs are a common tool for governments interested in protecting
domestic production from inexpensive imports.18 The importing country
simply assesses a tax at the border on whatever product it believes is

12

Economic modeling shows clear negative efficiency impacts for a partially implemented
GHG scheme. Duff, supra note 9, at 2069.
13
See THE WORLD BANK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE: ECONOMIC,
LEGAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3 (2008).
14
Id.
15
Gavin Goh, The World Trade Organization, Kyoto and Energy Tax Adjustments at the
Border, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 395, 398 (2004).
16
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55. U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT].
17
Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 143; see also THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 19,
29 (stating that some developing countries have proposed border taxes, and finding “some evidence”
of such taxes “having negative impacts on trade flows” and “export competitiveness”).
18
See, e.g., DUNCAN BRACK, MICHAEL GRUBB & CRAIG WINDRAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES 76 (2000).
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undercutting domestic producers, thereby evening out market
disparities.19 Such adjustments work for exports as well—countries
simply relax domestic taxes that would normally be applied if the taxed
product were not destined for export. BTAs are usually limited to
balancing indirect taxes (taxes applied either directly or indirectly to the
product), as opposed to direct taxes, which are imposed directly on
producers.20 BTAs for the costs of GHG regulation would be indirect
taxes—for example, fossil fuels are already subject to this kind of BTA
in many countries.21 On the other hand, BTAs related to production
processes, such as pollution emissions, are quite rare.22
The destination principle of international trade holds that taxes
should be applied at a particular product‟s final destination in order to
avoid the inequity of double taxation or no taxation at all. In theory,
BTAs follow this principle by taxing goods in the country of
consumption (taxes are on imports rather than exports), allowing each
country to pursue its own internal taxation scheme while competition in
international markets occurs on a level playing field. Under the
destination principle, in other words, taxes should not follow exported
goods.23
Inexpensive imports can be the result of any number of market
disparities, ranging from more advanced technology and production
methods in the country of origin to higher labor costs in the importing
country. Protectionism is the term used to describe measures designed to
protect producers from such imports.24 Historically, protectionism served
to prop up domestic industry for the time required to become competitive
in international markets.25 However, protectionism also leads to conflict
and economic inefficiency, and it is thus targeted for elimination by

19
Or even going so far as to disadvantage importers, thereby removing the import market in
that product altogether—after all, the power to tax is the “power to destroy.” M‟Culloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 327 (1819).
20
For example, social security taxes and payroll taxes would be considered direct taxes,
while sales taxes, value added taxes, excise duties, and consumption taxes would be considered
indirect taxes. See, e.g., Goh, supra note 15, at 399.
21
Id. (citing Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Economic/Fiscal
Instruments: Taxation (i.e. Carbon/Energy), Annex I Expert Group on the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Working Paper No. 4, 83, OCDE/GD(97)188).
22
Id.
23
Paul Demaret & Raoul Stewardson, Border Tax Adjustments Under GATT and EC Law
and General Implications for Environmental Taxes, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 6 (1994).
24
See Donald H. Regan, What Are Trade Agreements for? Conflicting Stories Told by
Economists, with a Lesson for Lawyers, 9 J. INT‟L ECON. L. 951, 966 (2006).
25
Id.
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numerous international agreements.26
Domestic environmental regulation can create market disparities
that favor imports from countries without such regulations. This opens
up the realm of regulatory protectionist measures.27 Barriers to the entry
of international producers into domestic markets are favored by both
industry and environmentalists, meaning that political considerations
often lead to the inclusion of such barriers despite their proven economic
inefficiency when compared to other forms of environmental
regulation.28 In addition to political pressures, the companies most likely
to be impacted by increased international competition control or
influence many of the most important indicators of injury, such as profit
margins and employment data, and are more likely to adjust their
behavior at the margin in the hope that the sacrifice of some marginal
profits in the short term will lead to large rewards from increased
protectionist profits in the long run.29
BTAs for the costs of GHG regulations are intensely controversial
because of sovereignty and equity concerns surrounding the imposition
of environmental norms through coercive trade measures.30 Lessdeveloped countries tend to be tolerant of greater levels of pollution in
their quest to develop their economies, and imposing one country‟s
standards on another challenges the ability of the people of lessdeveloped states to make critical development decisions.31 As a result,
there are no BTAs currently utilized by any regulatory or legislative

26

Id.
See Michael P. Leidy & Bernard M. Hoekman, ‗Cleaning Up‘ While Cleaning Up?
Pollution Abatement, Interest Groups and Contingent Trade Policies, 78 PUB. CHOICE 241, 248
(1994).
28
Id.
29
Id. at 250.
30
Goh, supra note 15, at 399; Goh adds that “some countries consider that action cannot be
delayed until international consensus is attained and that unilateral responses might be justified.” Id.
at 400; Andrew Green lists potential constraints to sovereignty posed by the WTO in general: “(i)
national treatment rules that limit the ability of states to introduce non-product related PPMs as well
as, potentially, innocent regulatory distinctions; (ii) scientific evidence requirements to the extent
they place hurdles in the path of states attempting to justify climate change action; and (iii) balancing
rules that provide less deference to domestic regulatory decisions in the face of scientific
uncertainty.” Andrew Green, Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and the WTO, 8 J. INT‟L ECON. L.
143, 187 (2005).
31
Dominic Gentile summarizes the argument thus: “[D]eveloping countries argue that many
of the global environmental problems that currently exist have been created by the developed
countries, not themselves. They thus, it is those countries contend it is those developed countries that
should bear the greatest burden in their resolution.” Dominic A. Gentile, International Trade and the
Environment: What is the Role of the WTO?, 19 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1975, 23027-228, 230
(2009).
27
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system of climate governance.32 Three of the primary complaints raised
concerning BTAs for the costs of GHG regulation are (1) that an efficient
methodology would be almost impossible to achieve, resulting in
reduced economic efficiency, unreasonable transaction costs, and the
potential for widespread systemic fraud;33 (2) that BTAs for greenhouse
gases would not be in conformity with various international trade
regimes that favor free trade, primarily those of GATT and the WTO;34
and (3) that BTAs are politically destructive because of their association
with protectionist trade policies and their potential to destroy delicate
negotiations toward cooperation on GHG emissions reductions.35 These
concerns will be covered in the sections to follow.
A. A RELATIVELY BRIEF OVERVIEW OF REGULATORY THEORY AS IT
RELATES TO CLIMATE ISSUES, GREENHOUSE GASES, AND BORDER
TAX ADJUSTMENTS
All of the world‟s economies produce GHGs to some extent,
whether it is through automobiles, factories, energy generation,
agriculture, or deforestation. With the increasing certainty of widespread
destruction as a result of anthropogenic GHG production and resulting
climate change, tensions worldwide are flaring over increasing demands
for binding GHG emissions targets.36 Under the Kyoto Protocol, states
with developing economies are generally not expected to achieve
specific GHG emissions reductions. The theory this arrangement was
based on, known as “common but differentiated responsibility” (CBDR),
was developed under international environmental law as an equity
principle to balance the burdens of environmental protection.37
Practically speaking, this has meant that developed economies agreed to
32

Paul-Erik Veel, Carbon Tariffs and the WTO: An Evaluation of Feasible Policies, 12 J.
INT‟L ECON. L. 749, 755 (2009).
33
See, e.g., Slayde Hawkins, Skirting Protectionism: A GHG-Based Trade Restriction Under
the WTO, 20 GEO. INT‟L ENVTL. L. REV. 427, 429 (2008); ZhongXiang Zhang & Lucas Assunção,
Domestic Climate Policies and the WTO, 27 THE WORLD ECONOMY 359, 380 (2004).
34
See, Goh, supra note 15.
35
Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 139-40.
36
For instance, at a recent meeting of the G8, developing countries and India in particular
rejected calls for binding targets on emissions. Mark Landler, Meeting Shows U.S.-India Split on
Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2009, available at www.nytimes.com/2009/07/20/world/asia/
20diplo.html?_r=1&scp=10&sq=india%20clinton&st=cse.
37
See UNFCCC, supra note 10, Preamble, Art. 3(1)(“The Parties should protect the climate
system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.
Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and
the adverse effects thereof.”).
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pay for the entire conversion to a low-carbon world economy.
The agreement of developed countries to take on that responsibility
was motivated by a number of important factors. Not only are developed
and industrialized economies primarily responsible for anthropogenic
atmospheric GHG concentrations—carbon takes approximately 100
years to cycle out of the atmosphere38—but these economies also have
the ability to pay for climate-change mitigation and adaptation, while
serious questions remain about whether developing countries have the
ability to shoulder a more significant share of the costs than they have to
date.39 Mitigation is the effort to reduce atmospheric GHG
concentrations.40 Adaptation refers to efforts aimed at improving and
protecting existing infrastructure under the assumption that certain
climate-change impacts are unavoidable despite mitigation.41
Under CBDR, everyone shares the responsibility to take climate
change into account, but the responsibility is differentiated according to
each country‟s ability to pay. Thus, under the Kyoto Protocol developing
economies were encouraged to restrain increases in GHG emissions, but
they were not required to set binding emissions limits. Under the system
eventually developed, climate-change-related development aid was
earmarked for developing economies. This aid took a number of different
forms, with strong financial incentives for wealthier nations, listed in
Annex I of the UNFCCC and assigned specific GHG reduction targets
under the Kyoto Protocol, to invest in low-carbon infrastructure in nonAnnex I countries. Kyoto‟s Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM)
even allow Annex I countries to meet their emissions targets by paying
for low-carbon infrastructure enhancements in other countries. In
essence, CDM is the carrot offered by the Kyoto Protocol to non-Annex I
countries—if they play along with the agenda, there are significant
38
Dan Galpern, Climate Change 101: Urgency and Response, 23 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 191,
198 (2008) (“A substantial share of any given emission burst of CO2 decays within a century.
However, approximately one-third remains after 100 years, and nearly one-fifth lingers after 1000
years. Accordingly, a significant share of current emissions will continue to warm the climate system
for many centuries even if such emission levels are reduced in the near future.”).
39
Some of the rationales behind the need for developing economies to emit GHGs, and
thereby grow their economies more quickly, will be covered in greater depth a little bit later.
40
UNFCCC supra note 10, Glossary of Climate Change Acronyms, available at
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/glossary/items/3666.php (mitigation is defined as “a human
intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases. Examples include using
fossil fuels more efficiently for industrial processes or electricity generation, switching to solar
energy or wind power, improving the insulation of buildings, and expanding forests and other
“sinks” to remove greater amounts of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.”).
41
Id. (adaption is defined as “[a]djustment in natural or human systems in response to actual
or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial
opportunities.”).
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investment options for Annex I countries.
In a perfect world, such multilateral cooperation would be all that
was required to accomplish international cooperation. The ideal solution
is to simply sit everyone down and agree to a solution that equitably
shares costs and benefits—conduct climate policy through negotiation
rather than through unilateral measures. But the Kyoto Protocol has
faced numerous problems, not the least of which was the initial refusal of
significant Annex I countries like the United States and Australia to
commit to binding GHG emissions targets. This poses serious legitimacy
problems for the Kyoto climate regime and related emissions trading
systems, because in order to be effective any system of climate
governance must be binding upon the world‟s largest emitters. It also
poses serious economic questions for Annex I Kyoto signatories. These
countries face competitive disadvantages in international markets,
because their economies are bearing the burden of GHG reductions while
many of their competitors, like the United States and China, do nothing.
With such market advantages comes the possibility of GHG-intensive
industries moving to less-regulated countries—a process known as
“carbon leakage.”42 Such competitiveness concerns are a major
stumbling block for countries considering taxes on GHG producing
activities. Moreover, questions about the legality of BTAs for these types
of taxes under international law, and especially under the law of the
WTO, could dissuade countries from adopting such taxes in the first
place.43
Indeed, concerns about competitiveness are some of the primary
objections cited by the United States as the basis for its refusal to agree
to binding emissions targets.44 A strong theme in climate discussions
concerns competitiveness in international markets and the perception that
GHG regulation results in a competitive disadvantage for domestic
industry.45 GHG-based BTAs would address concerns about carbon
leakage and concerns about competitive disadvantages and would lead to
the introduction of more-effective domestic GHG regulations.46

42
Arjun Ponnambalam, U.S. Climate Change Legislation and the Use of GATT Article XX
To Justify a ―Competitiveness Provision‖ in the Wake of Brazil—Tyres, 40 GEO. J. INT‟L L. 261, 264
(2008).
43
See Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 63 (“[E]xisting [GATT] rules probably need
to be modified for an alternative, more environmentally friendly approach to the adjustment of
environmental taxes to be fully implemented without harming the international competitiveness of
industries or giving rise to trade disputes.”).
44
See Ponnambalam, supra note 42, at 264.
45
Hawkins, supra note 33.
46
See id. at 427-29; Zhang & Assunção, supra note 33, at 360.
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Domestic Regulatory Pressures and Trends and the Role That
Border Tax Adjustments Could Play

Energy production and other GHG-producing activities play a
central role in all of the world‟s economies. The economic centrality of
GHGs forces governments interested in reducing their emissions to make
difficult policy choices.47 Domestic policy is often shaped by powerful
economic interests, especially the types of interests tending to be most
affected by environmental regulation. Reductions in expected profits
result in strong opposition from these types of interests.48 Corporate,
profit-driven entities tend to band together to form lobbying groups to
influence representative governments. Some of the most effective
lobbying groups are relatively small, due to the prohibitive cost of largescale group organizing.49 Therefore, legislation that results in a widely
dispersed distribution of both costs and benefits, such as climate
legislation, will be underrepresented in a legislative system where
focused interest groups influence domestic legislators.50 Smaller industry
groups are highly motivated by research showing that measures
involving carbon taxes or energy efficiency standards, two prominent
options for GHG regulation, have statistically significant negative
impacts on trade flows and thus on competitiveness.51 For this reason,
many of the smaller, more effective lobbying groups tend to oppose
GHG regulation by accentuating specific economic concerns.
One prominent concern among Annex I countries is the risk of
GHG regulation driving domestic industry to relocate their GHGemitting activities, and the jobs that these activities create, to countries
with less-stringent regulation while continuing to sell the same volume
and type of product in domestic markets. As mentioned earlier, this
process is known as “carbon leakage,” and because of the global impact
of carbon emissions, regardless of where the source of the GHG
emissions is located, such leakage represents a significant efficiency

47

PORTER, ET. AL., supra note 4, at 113.
Id. at 71. (“Corporations have worked to weaken several global environmental regimes,
including ozone protection, climate change, whaling, the international toxic waste trade, and
fisheries”).
49
See Nita Ghei, Evaluating the WTO‘s Two Step Test for Environmental Measures Under
Article XX, 18 COLO. J. INT‟L ENVTL. L. & POL‟Y 117, 125 (2007).
50
Id. at 126. Ghei points out the corollary as well: “[W]hen either the costs or benefits are
only narrowly distributed, that is, a small group either bears most of the costs or garners most of the
benefits, strong lobbying by that group will often increase the likelihood of passage of legislation
that favors the interest group.” Id.
51
THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 27-9.
48
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threat to domestic regulation aimed at climate change mitigation.52 In
other words, mandated domestic reductions in GHG emissions would
result in little or no net global reductions in GHG emissions under a
worst-case leakage scenario. Some estimate that emissions reductions in
developed countries could be negatively impacted by as much as twenty
percent by increased emissions due to leakage in developing countries.53
Actual evidence of such leakage is fairly limited—thus concerns may be
more theoretical than real—but because the costs of GHG regulation are
expected to be so much higher than anything currently in place, these
concerns remain prominent in many domestic regulatory decisions.
Disparities between the strength of GHG regulations also imply a
threat to the competitiveness of developed economy industries.54 Lax
domestic GHG regulation gives energy-intensive industries an artificial
market advantage, because the global economy does not require such
industries to pay for the negative externalities of climate change. As
Paul-Erik Veel explains, “[a]lthough it remains desirable for those
countries that are relatively most efficient at producing a particular good
to produce it, the notion of efficiency necessarily needs to include those
externalities which arise as a result of that production.”55 Again, actual
evidence of competitiveness disparities is relatively limited, but concerns
remain because of the high cost of anticipated GHG reductions.
According to the World Bank, debate over the negative impacts of
GHG regulation on energy-intensive sectors has “derailed any efforts in
the United States to impose a carbon tax, or in the EU to institute a
common framework on energy taxation.”56 Indeed, the political pressures
brought by companies in the United States as a result of concerns about
competiveness are one of the primary reasons why the United States
refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol.57 Protectionist pressures lead Annex I
countries to pursue GHG emission reductions in a manner that favors
domestic over foreign producers.58 This leads to inefficient economic
performance and ineffective regulatory regimes. Because of the manner
in which climate regulation has evolved, a developing trend in
discussions of greenhouse gas regulation involves so-called “bottom up”
climate regimes.59 Bottom-up climate regimes involve regional and sub52

Veel, supra note 32, at 751-2.
THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 30.
54
Id. at 30; see also Veel, supra note 32, at 752.
55
Id. at 753.
56
THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 24.
57
Veel, supra note 32, at 753.
58
See Zhang & Assunção, supra note 33, at 360.
59
See, e.g., CLIMATE AND TRADE POLICY: BOTTOM-UP APPROACHES TOWARDS GLOBAL
53

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001

13

Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 3
03_B. EICHENBERG PRINTER VERSION

296

5/22/2010 11:27 AM

GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J.

[Vol. 3

regional negotiations and provide an alternative to what some view as the
increasingly unlikely prospect of achieving a global climate agreement.60
The result of these regulatory pressures and trends is a system in
need of methods to accurately measure and then fairly balance the
interests of domestic producers, international trade, and environmental
effectiveness. Concerns about carbon leakage, for instance, could
probably be adequately addressed by carbon tariffs or BTAs.61 BTAs,
which rebate environmental taxes to companies upon export and add
environmental taxes to imports, would significantly reduce pressures to
provide tax exemptions or other efficiency inhibiting measures to
domestic industry.62 Indeed, the three primary obstacles to domestic
GHG regulation—carbon leakage, competitiveness concerns, and
considerations of political economy—would be addressed by the
imposition of complementary BTAs to whatever form of GHG regulation
domestic legislators or regulators decide upon.63
ii.

GHG Taxes, Especially Carbon Taxes, and the Role That Border
Tax Adjustment Could Play

By and large, attempts to implement broad-based taxes on carbon
dioxide emissions from all aspects of society in some of the world‟s most
developed economies have failed.64 Such a carbon taxes would help
correct for current climate externalities by raising the price of products
that produce the main GHG, carbon dioxide. In spite of widespread
failure to implement such taxes, the prevailing view among economists is
that a carbon tax would be the most efficient and effective way to
address anthropogenic climate change, especially as compared to certain
types of energy taxes.65 A carbon tax would be efficient because it would
allow the market to determine efficient carbon emission reductions
without the overhead of a bureaucratic regulatory agency.66
One prominent reason for failures to implement carbon taxes is the
heavy impact such taxes are predicted to have on the competitiveness of
energy-intensive products like steel and cement. In essence, such
products will have a penalty assessed against them in the international
AGREEMENT (Carlo Carraro & Christian Egenhofer eds., 2007).
60
Id. at 1-2.
61
Veel, supra note 32, at 1751.
62
Goh, supra note 15, at 400.
63
See Veel, supra note 32, at 751-52.
64
Zhang & Assunção, supra note 33, at 376.
65
See id.
66
See id.; see generally Duff, supra note 9.
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marketplace as compared with products produced in countries that do not
levy such taxes.67 Levels for such taxes, especially where used as the
primary means of GHG mitigation, are predicted to be high, although
legal scholar David Duff points to studies in Sweden and Finland that
show positive GHG reductions as a result of relatively modest GHG
taxes.68 Even the few countries that have successfully implemented
carbon taxes have so far either exempted energy-intensive industry or
cycled the taxes back into industry-protective grants and subsidies.69
Therefore, potential losers under a system of carbon taxes commit
significant resources to defeating such measures, even threatening to
relocate production facilities as a result of increasing energy costs. This
action is taken in spite of increasing evidence that current differences in
environmental standards are not a significant factor in international
competitiveness or in the relative price levels for different products.70
BTAs would allow regulators to apply a GHG-based tax to domestic
producers without having to worry about adverse competitiveness effects
because the penalty of higher energy costs would be removed. A BTA
for carbon taxes applied to energy product imports and exports would be
relatively straightforward under existing WTO rules, so long as there is
no discrimination between like products, while a BTA on finished
products would be more complicated.71 WTO methodology and
compliance will be covered in depth later, when WTO rules applicable to
BTAs are addressed.
B.

A RELATIVELY BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE EQUITABLE ISSUES
UNDERLYING THE CLIMATE CRISIS

A community standard or norm is emerging that says that
reasonable reductions in GHG emitting activities are morally required.72
World economic disparity in general presents stark equitable fallacies,
and developing economies tend to be suspicious of environmental
imperatives imposed by those not suffering a lack of basic human
67

Zhang & Assunção, supra note 33, at 377.
Duff, supra note 9, at 2091; see also THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 20 (“[A] carbon
tax may significantly increase production costs, leading to lower profits, either through lower
margins or through a reduction in sales (or both).”).
69
See Zhang & Assunção, supra note 33, at 378; see also THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13,
at 24.
70
Zhang & Assunção, supra note 33, at 377-78; see also THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13,
at 24 (noting that industries will migrate to other countries to avoid environmental taxes).
71
See Zhang & Assunção, supra note 33, at 380.
72
Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565, 15991600 (2008).
68
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necessities such as security, health care, and nutrition.73 Trends in
economic relations have not necessarily been getting better either. In
1970 the richest twenty percent of the world‟s nations controlled seventy
percent of the world‟s gross domestic product.74 By 1997 the richest
twenty percent controlled eighty percent of the world‟s gross domestic
product.75 Therefore, it is not difficult reach the conclusion that those
who both caused the problem to begin with and are most able to pay for a
solution should be the ones to do so.
Environmental taxes in general are justified on moral grounds as
furthering the “polluter pays” principle, found for example in Principle
16 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: “National
authorities should endeavor to promote the internalization of
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into
account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost
of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting
international trade and investment.”76 This principle approaches
environmental resources from the perspective that such resources are
commonly owned, and environmental taxes are means to assert common
ownership and allocate the costs of environmental damage to those
responsible.77
Another ethical rationale for environmental taxes, a transformative
or educational rationale, has been suggested by Duff. Under this rationale
environmental harms are viewed as consequences of economic
development that can be minimized by changing attitudes and focusing
attention on environmentally sensitive practices. Thus, the main purpose
of environmental taxes, and by extension GHG-based BTAs, is “to
encourage environmental awareness and shared responsibility for
creating a better environmental future.”78 Thus, taxes and adjustments
should target GHG-producing activity to the extent that doing so alters

73
See PORTER ET AL., supra note 4, at 3. One estimate states that basic health care and
nutrition for everyone would cost approximately 13 billion dollars annually, four billion less than is
spent on pet food in Europe and the United States.
74
Id. at 177.
75
Id.
76
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 16 (June 14, 1992),
available at www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163
&l=en. There are many sources that cite and elucidate the “polluter pays” principle. The Rio
Declaration is cited here as a representative and internationally accepted example.
77
Duff, supra note 9, at 2069. Duff criticizes the “polluter pays” principle as being
“inappropriately individualistic,” pointing out that there are many segments of society that bear
indirect responsibility for environmental degradation. Id. at 2077.
78
Id. at 2070.
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established environmentally harmful attitudes and practices.79
Climate regimes, regulatory structures that aim to mitigate the
impact of climate change, and binding GHG emissions targets, raise
particular equity issues relating to GHG emissions allocation strategies.
An accurate measurement of stress on the global environment must take
into account both population and consumption, and by any reasonable
measure consumption is growing more quickly than population.80
Nonetheless, “the world‟s leading emitters account for a strikingly large
percentage of the world‟s emissions. Indeed, the United States and
China, by themselves, are responsible for about forty percent of the
world‟s total. Most of the world‟s nations, including many poor
countries, are trivial contributors.”81 Furthermore, responsibility for
anthropogenic climate change, and the suffering that will result, is
disproportionately allocated between developed and developing
economies. Some estimate that developed countries are responsible for as
much as seventy percent of the GHGs in the atmosphere, while
developing countries are responsible for only twenty-five percent and
will suffer the most due to the locations of their population centers and
their lack of resources to pay for costs related to adaptation to climate
change.82 GHG emissions represent what is known in economics as a
large-group externality problem, a problem caused by the actions of a
large group that have consequences external to the causational group,
because the impacts of climate change are not felt as strongly by those
who primarily caused the problem83—both because of the long life-cycle
of carbon in the atmosphere (carbon currently causing climate change
effects was emitted as much as 100 years ago) and because most of the
largest emitting countries can afford to protect their populations from the
worst impacts of climate change.
Border tax adjustment schemes raise some specific equity issues
when applied by wealthy nations to strengthen environmental regulation.
Countries that do not implement satisfactory environmental and tax
regimes could be disadvantaged through lower export revenue. Energy

79

Id. at 2072.
PORTER ET AL., supra note 4, at 2.
81
Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated on a
Per Capita Basis?, 97 CAL. L. REV. 51, 59-60 (2009).
82
Heather D. Shumaker, The Economic Effects of the European Union Carbon Dioxide
Emission Quota on the New Member States of the European Union: Can They Become Equal
Economic Partners of the European Union While Complying with the 2008-2012 Quota?, 17 PENN.
ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 99, 110 (2008).
83
Andrew Green, You Can‘t Pay Them Enough: Subsidies, Environmental Law, and Social
Norms, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 407, 412-13 (2006).
80
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resources are not evenly distributed in the world, and some deem it
unfair that the countries that of necessity burn more coal than oil and gas
are penalized.84 Additionally, there could be serious imperialistic
overtones to a tax regime forcing poorer, raw-material-exporting
countries to harmonize their internal tax structures with those of their
primary export markets.85 BTAs for environmental purposes go beyond
the achievement of domestic policy goals by demanding that other
countries value environmental concerns over economic growth and thus
impinge the sovereignty of foreign nations.
Equity concerns such as these could play a significant role in
international climate negotiations and have already forced the
incorporation of equitable economic principles like “polluter pays” and
CBDR into multilateral climate agreements. Historically, environmental
protection in general and climate change prevention in particular have
been seen as wealthy-economy agendas.86 Incorporated into these
agendas, in the opinion of many developing economies, is the desire to
obstruct the ability of less-wealthy nations to develop their economies
and so maintain developed economic dominance over the world‟s natural
resource wealth.87 To the extent that trust plays an important role in
multilateral negotiations, BTAs could damage the potential for consensus
approaches if developing countries regard environmental protections as
imperialist or protectionist policy delivery tools. After all, as explained
earlier, BTAs have historically been used to do just this. This is one of
the battles that the WTO will fight in its role as an arbiter of global free
trade, and much rests on its ability to represent itself as an independent
and objective source of law.
C.

THE UNFCCC AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

At the December 2007 United Nations Climate Change Conference
on the island of Bali in Indonesia, participating nations adopted the Bali
Roadmap (also known as the Bali Action Plan) as the beginning of a
two-year process toward finalizing a binding agreement in 2009 in
Denmark. While international climate regimes like the Kyoto Protocol,
instituted as a result of the UNFCCC, do not require parties to impose
trade restrictions as a condition of compliance, various mitigation
mechanisms unilaterally implemented could be viewed as inconsistent

84

Goh, supra note 15, at 421.
Id.
86
PORTER ET AL., supra note 4, at 178.
87
Id. at 179.
85
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with WTO law where they have some impact on trade.88 While many call
for changes to GATT that reflect environmental imperatives,89 the reality
of international law is that new climate-change measures must take into
account the structure and goals of the WTO.90 Article 3.5 of the
UNFCCC states that “measures taken to combat climate change,
including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international
trade.”91
On February 16, 2005, the Kyoto Protocol, a result of the UNFCCC
process, went into effect.92 The Kyoto Protocol attempts to address
climate change through the UNFCCC principle of “common but
differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR), stating that “developed country
Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse
effects thereof.”93 Annex I countries are generally committed to reducing
their GHG emissions to around five percent below 1990 levels by 2012,
while non-Annex I countries have no specific targets.94 All signatories
must report their GHG emissions levels and develop climate-change
mitigation programs. The Kyoto Protocol does not dictate how GHG
emissions reductions in Annex I countries are to occur, but rather
establishes three “flexibility” mechanisms: (1) Joint Implementation, (2)
the Clean Development Mechanism, and (3) Emissions Trading
Systems.95

88

See Anita M. Halvorssen, UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the WTO—Brewing
Conflicts or Are They Mutually Supportive?, 36 DENV. J. INT‟L L. & POL‟Y 369, 377 (2008).
89
See, e.g. id. at 370 (“Nicholas Stern projected that if action is not taken now, it may cost 520% of global GDP each year from now to address climate change. . . . „Just as other financial
institutions are addressing climate change, the World Trade Organization (WTO) needs to be
working on how it can address climate change issues related to trade in a comprehensive manner.‟”
(quoting Nicholas Stern, Stern Review: The Economics of Climate change, www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/media/3/2/Summary_of_Conclusions.pdf)).
90
There is “a general recognition by both regimes to respect the other‟s mandate.” THE
WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 40; see e.g., CHRISTINA VOIGT, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AS A
PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN CLIMATE MEASURES AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009).
91
UNFCCC, supra note 10, Art. 3(5), May 9, 1992, available at http://unfccc.int/essential_
background /convention/background/items/2853.php.
92
THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 2.
93
UNFCCC, supra note 10, Art. 3 ¶ 1.
94
Kyoto Protocol to the United National Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article
III ¶¶ 1-3, Dec. 11, 1997, available at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php. (outlining
responsibilities of Annex I countries); see also Kyoto Protocol, Essential Background, at
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.
95
THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 2; see also UNFCCC, supra note 10, The
Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, available at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/
mechanisms/items/1673.php.
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The GHG trading systems set up under the auspices of the Kyoto
protocol, including the European Union Emissions Trading System, are
projected to amount to a one-trillion-dollar market in emissions
allowances by 2012—in other words, the largest single economic sector
on earth. The goals set in Kyoto have both hard and soft law impacts,
with targets and guidelines being adopted in practice even by nonsignatories. However, the fact that the Kyoto Protocol leaves specific
implementation strategies up to individual signatories passes
responsibility to the WTO—through regulations concerning subsidies,
BTAs, technical specifications and requirements, governmental
procurement, and taxes—to govern the options countries have to fulfill
their Kyoto obligations.96 This is problematic because the WTO was
created solely to facilitate free trade and is not always well-equipped to
handle trans-boundary environmental disputes.
The Kyoto Protocol itself, though billed as an attempt at global
climate governance, could perhaps be more readily described as a subglobal agreement. The continued refusal of major GHG emitters like the
United States and China to commit to binding emissions targets
contributes to this perception and draws into question the legitimacy of
claims that the Kyoto Protocol is a global agreement.
D.

DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS: WHY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES NEED
TO EMIT CARBON AND THE PRESSING NEED TO ADDRESS GHG
OUTPUT FROM DEVELOPING ECONOMIES

Due to growth in population and gross domestic product, the
majority of GHG emissions in the future will come from developing
countries.97 Developing countries are following the same carbonintensive development path mapped out by the developed economies of
the world. Currently, eighty percent of the world‟s population resides in
developing countries that consume a little more than one third of the
world‟s energy.98 Seventy percent or more of global GHG emissions
increases from 2020 to 2030 are projected to come from non-Annex I
countries, with China alone contributing nearly twenty-five percent of
that expected increase.99 China‟s emissions have already overtaken those
of the United States, based in large part on a strong dependence on

96

See Kernohan & De Cian, supra note 2, at 75.
Shumaker, supra note 82, at 110.
98
PORTER ET AL., supra note 4, at 4.
99
THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 46.
97

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol3/iss2/3

20

Eichenberg: Greenhouse Gas Regulation
03_B. EICHENBERG PRINTER VERSION

5/22/2010 11:27 AM

2010] GREENHOUSE GASES AND BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS 303
coal.100 Indeed, current GHG emissions reductions in developed
countries are likely to be more than offset by emissions increases from
developing countries.101
In addition to the need to catch up to the higher standards of living
in more-developed economies—an imperative that is generally perceived
to require ever-increasing carbon emissions—developing countries often
regard the imposition of environmental standards on trade with
suspicion. China, for instance, prioritizes economic growth over
environmental concerns, especially when the goal is to prevent premature
death from easily preventable causes like infant mortality and inadequate
sanitation.102 Environmental measures and protectionist interests that
seek to exclude international competition from the domestic markets of
wealthier nations often go hand-in-hand due to industry lobbying
pressures and the apathy of environmental interests toward an optimal
economic solution at the cost of environmental certainty.103
Worldwide GHG regulatory efforts must take into account
developing economies to a much greater extent than has so far been the
case. By about 2030, fifty percent or more of global purchasing power
will reside in developing economies.104 Additionally, GHG emissions
estimates project that sometime between 2020 and 2030 developing
countries will pass developed countries in GHG emissions from energy
use.105
Many developing countries oppose the imposition of carbon tariffs
or BTAs because they believe that GHG regulation will slow economic
growth. One avenue for this opposition is the WTO—China, for instance,
believes that BTAs and carbon tariffs would violate WTO rules.106 The
realities of development economics and the perceived need for increasing
carbon emissions in developing economies means that any GHG-based
border measure will almost certainly result in a WTO challenge.
II.

THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, AND BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENT

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was
originally enacted in 1947 as a part of sweeping international legal
100

Id. at 46-47.
Id. at 47.
102
See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 72, at 1582.
103
See Ghei, supra note 49, at 131-32.
104
THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 3.
105
Id.
106
Veel, supra note 32, at 750.
101
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reforms instigated as a response to the Second World War. Nothing in
GATT addresses, or was intended to address, many of the environmental
concerns that so urgently demand the attention of the WTO today. GATT
was originally intended to establish a system of international trade
regulation through an International Trade Organization as a means to
peaceably settle trade disputes. But such a regulatory body did not
materialize, and GATT became a set of ad hoc guidelines for nations to
resolve trade policy disputes—ad hoc because there was no enforcement
mechanism.
Into this void stepped the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Created in 1994 by the Marrakesh Agreement, the WTO has real
enforcement powers based on the suspension of trade advantages secured
under the Agreement. As of July 23, 2008, 158 countries are members of
GATT.107 The 1994 Marrakesh Agreement made 1947 GATT rules
binding on all signatories, incorporating the basic structure of the
original agreement as its foundation.108 Essentially, this structure is
founded on three principles: (1) the Most Favored Nation Principle, (2)
the National Treatment Principle, and (3) the general elimination of
quantitative restrictions.109 These are collectively known as the
substantive portions of GATT.
The Most Favored Nation Principle contained in Article I of GATT
states simply that an importing country must treat all members of the
WTO equally, as most-favored nations.110 In other words, all products
imported from member states must be treated the same regardless of their
country of origin. For instance, the United States cannot place a special
tariff on all products imported from France without also placing that
tariff on all products imported from every member state.
The National Treatment Principle contained in the first paragraph of
107
World Trade Organization, Members and Observers, available at www.wto.org/
english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.
108
Throughout this Article I will refer to the provisions of GATT 1947 with the
understanding that these same provisions appear in GATT 1994, unless otherwise noted. GATT
1994 must be read with GATT 1947.
109
GATT, supra note 16, Art. I (General Most-Favored-Nation Treatment), Art. III (National
Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation), Art. XI (General Elimination of Quantitative
Restrictions).
110
Id. Art. I ¶ 1 (“With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for
imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with
respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect
to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or
destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.”).
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GATT Article III states that all similar products must be treated the
same, whether they are produced domestically or on foreign soil.111 The
purpose of this restriction is to protect the equality of competitive
conditions by ensuring that protective domestic measures are not applied
to domestic production.112 Thus, GATT expressly warns in the second
paragraph of Article III against applying unequal treatment “so as to
afford protection to domestic production.”113 Read together, the first and
second paragraphs of Article III show that parties to GATT may apply
charges to imported products, so long as those charges do not exceed
charges already applied to domestically produced products.114 A
violation of the National Treatment Principle occurs when taxes on
imported products are in excess of those on like domestic products.115
Finally, GATT‟s underlying trade liberalization principles are
reflected in the rule that quantitative restrictions on trade, or quotas, will
be gradually eliminated over an indeterminate length of time. Rules
addressing quantitative restrictions and prohibitions are generally set out
in GATT Article XI.116 GATT Article II requires member states to set
maximum tariff levels.117 As a corollary, countries are not allowed to
111
Id. Art. III ¶ 1-2. The National Treatment Principle states that: “[t]he contracting parties
recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements
affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products,
and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified
amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford
protection to domestic production.” Id. at ¶ 1. Additionally, “[t]he products of the territory of any
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject,
directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those
applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party shall
otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner
contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.” Id. at ¶ 2.
112
Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 97, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), available at
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds135_e.htm.
113
GATT, supra note 16, Art. III ¶ 1.
114
Id. at ¶¶ 1-2.
115
Goh, supra note 15, at 401-2.
116
See Gentile, supra note 31, at 203 (“Article XI for the most part forbids the use, by a
member country, of quantitative restrictions and prohibitions.”).
117
GATT, supra note 16, Art. II ¶ 1(a)-(c) (“(a) Each contracting party shall accord to the
commerce of the other contracting parties treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the
appropriate Part of the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement. (b) The products described
in Part I of the Schedule relating to any contracting party, which are the products of territories of
other contracting parties, shall, on their importation into the territory to which the Schedule relates,
and subject to the terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in that Schedule, be exempt from
ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided therein. Such products shall also be
exempt from all other duties or charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with the
importation in excess of those imposed on the date of this Agreement or those directly and
mandatorily required to be imposed thereafter by legislation in force in the importing territory on

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001

23

Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 3
03_B. EICHENBERG PRINTER VERSION

306

5/22/2010 11:27 AM

GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J.

[Vol. 3

subsidize most forms of exports.118 Under this principle, the only
permissible restrictions on trade would come to be duties, taxes, or other
charges.119
These three principles further the WTO‟s philosophy of “ensuring a
certain trade neutrality.”120 They also reflect the ideology of the WTO by
encouraging the functioning of free-market principles in order to both
prevent conflict and help establish an optimal international trading
system. While these principles were not designed to limit the ability of
states to set their own levels of environmental protection, the application
of GATT rules tends to create effective limitations to domestic
environmental agendas.121
Although GATT contained few environmental principles, the WTO
has adopted a theoretical approach to climate change based on its stated
goal to improve the welfare of the world‟s population by raising overall
standards of living.122 Standards of living are to be raised by expanding
trade while respecting the restraints of limited resources and the principle

that date. (c) The products described in Part II of the Schedule relating to any contracting party
which are the products of territories entitled under Article I to receive preferential treatment upon
importation into the territory to which the Schedule relates shall, on their importation into such
territory, and subject to the terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in that Schedule, be exempt
from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided for in Part II of that Schedule.
Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation in excess of those imposed on the date of this Agreement or those
directly or mandatorily required to be imposed thereafter by legislation in force in the importing
territory on that date. Nothing in this Article shall prevent any contracting party from maintaining its
requirements existing on the date of this Agreement as to the eligibility of goods for entry at
preferential rates of duty.”).
118
Id. Art. XVI ¶ 4 (“Further, as from 1 January 1958 or the earliest practicable date
thereafter, contracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of subsidy on
the export of any product other than a primary product which subsidy results in the sale of such
product for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like product to buyers
in the domestic market. Until 31 December 1957 no contracting party shall extend the scope of any
such subsidization beyond that existing on 1 January 1955 by the introduction of new, or the
extension of existing, subsidies.”).
119
See id. at Art. XI ¶ 1 (“No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall
be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory
of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the
territory of any other contracting party.”).
120
Report of the Working Party, Border Tax Adjustments, ¶ 9, L/3464 (Dec. 2, 1970),
available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/bordertax.pdf.
121
See Gentile, supra note 31, at 202.
122
See Halvorssen, supra note 88, at 375 (“The goal of the WTO is to improve the welfare of
peoples by, among other things, „raising their standard of living‟ and „expanding the production of
trade in goods and services, while allowing for optimal use of the world‟s resources in accordance
with the objective of sustainable development seeking both to protect and preserve the environment
and to enhance the means for doing so . . . .”).
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of sustainable development.123 Indeed, “most countries that are more
open to trade adopt cleaner technologies more quickly, and increased real
income is often associated with increased demand for environmental
quality.”124 The preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement, after specifically
mentioning sustainable development, states that signatories to the
agreement seek “both to protect and preserve the environment and to
enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their
respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic
development.”125 The long-term effects of climate change will render
these goals hollow window dressing if the WTO cannot adapt to the
challenges posed to the world economic system by the dangers of
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and climate change.126 In the
end, the goals of the climate treaties and the goals of the WTO are the
same, to promote the overall welfare of all human beings.127
Aside from GATT, there are some additional agreements (called
“multilateral trade agreements” in the Marrakesh Agreement128) under
the umbrella of the WTO that could impact the use of BTAs as a tool to
balance domestic climate-change regulation. The Marrakesh Agreement
states that, in cases of conflict with GATT, the provisions of these
secondary, multilateral trade agreements will take precedence.129 In
1994, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM
Agreement) was signed by the 128 original WTO signatories in order to
further
define
trade-distorting
subsidies
and
associated
123

Id. at 375.
THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 9.
125
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, available at
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf.
126
Halvorssen, supra note 88, at 375.
127
Id. at 379.
128
The agreements listed in Annex 1A are the Agreement on Agriculture, Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Agreement on Textiles and Clothing,
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures,
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,
Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, Agreement on Rules of Origin, Agreement on Import
Licensing Procedures, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and the Agreement on
Safeguards. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, available at
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf.
129
Id. at Art. XVI(3) (“Accordingly, contracting parties should seek to avoid the use of
subsidies on the export of primary products. If, however, a contracting party grants directly or
indirectly any form of subsidy which operates to increase the export of any primary product from its
territory, such subsidy shall not be applied in a manner which results in that contracting party having
more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product, account being taken of the shares
of the contracting parties in such trade in the product during a previous representative period, and
any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting such trade in the product.”).
124
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countermeasures.130 The SCM Agreement provides that “the exemption
of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the like product
when destined for domestic consumption, or the remission of such duties
or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not
be deemed to be a subsidy.”131 This agreement also provides an
Illustrative List of Export Subsidies that reinforce the distinction between
direct and indirect taxes (addressed in more depth in following
sections).132
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement),
also added in 1994, was instituted to ensure that technical regulations and
product standards do not create unnecessary obstacles to international
trade.133 Technical regulations are defined as documents that define
“product characteristics or their related processes and production
methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which
compliance is mandatory.”134 This definition could easily include
processes and production methods (PPMs) related to environmental
conservation and energy usage.135 The preamble to the TBT Agreement
looks very similar to the chapeau of Article XX—a set of clauses that
allow exceptions to the rest of GATT for certain enumerated reasons—
with similar anti-discrimination language,136 and it imposes an obligation
on states to use the least trade-restrictive measure reasonably available to
accomplish policy goals.137 This requirement may imply a necessity test
even broader than that required under GATT,138 as will be discussed in
130

Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (1994), available at
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#tbt, [hereinafter SCM Agreement]; see also
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, 33 ILM 1125 (Sept. 1994) (including SCM Agreement as
part of GATT).
131
Id. at Art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii) n.1; see also Gentile, supra note 31, at 204.
132
Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 13.
133
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (1994), available at www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#tbt [hereinafter TBT Agreement]; see also General Agreement on Trade
and Tariffs, 33 ILM 1125 (Sept. 1994) (including TBT Agreement as part of GATT).
134
TBT Agreement, supra note 133, Annex 1(1).
135
See Andrew Green & Tracey Epps, The WTO, Science, and the Environment: Moving
Towards Consistency, 10 J. INT‟L ECON. L. 285, 300 (2007).
136
The preamble to the TBT Agreement states, in relevant part, that
no country should be prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure the quality of its
exports, or for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, of the environment, or
for the prevention of deceptive practices, at the levels it considers appropriate, subject to the
requirement that they are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail
or a disguised restriction on international trade . . .
See also Green, supra note 30, at 154.
137
See TBT Agreement, supra note 133, Preamble (quoted above in note 136).
138
Green, supra note 30, at 147-48.
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greater depth a little bit later on. However, because the TBT Agreement
does not specifically address taxes and import duties, but is rather aimed
primarily at mandatory technical standards, it is unlikely to have a direct
impact on BTAs.
A.

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS AND
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

Disputes between GATT member states before 1994 were decided
by non-binding GATT Panels, while those decided after 1994 are first
heard by a WTO Panel, with the possibility of appeal to the Appellate
Body. Under the terms of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, these
decisions become binding once adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB).139 Such adoption is automatic unless the DSB is notified of a
party‟s intent to appeal a Panel decision to the Appellate Body or unless
there is a consensus vote against adoption by the WTO members voting
in the DSB.140 It is important to note that there have been some decisions
that have not been adopted by the DSB, and that the status of these
decisions can be more properly thought of as somewhat persuasive, if
they have any impact at all, whereas decisions approved by the DSB tend
to be more akin to binding precedent.
The DSB keeps “under surveillance the implementation of adopted
recommendations or rulings,” and states are required to furnish status
reports concerning compliance.141 States may request “[c]ompensation
and the suspension of concessions or other obligations” if an adopted
decision is not complied with in a reasonable period of time.142
Ultimately, a decision adopted by the DSB could grant the plaintiff state
permission to impose trade sanctions on the defendant state until the
infraction is remedied.143 Therefore, it should be evident that GATT
infringements can be quite costly to offending states. Because of this, the
enforcement regime of the WTO has been one of the most effective
international courts in the world, and its decisions tend to be reliably

139

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Article II,
(1994) [hereinafter DSU]; see also Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, available at www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf.;see also Jasper L.
Ozbirn, An Analysis and Synthesis of the Decisional Law Applying Article XX(g) of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 21 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 371, 373 (2008).
140
DSU, supra note 139, Art. 16 ¶ 4.
141
Id. Art. 21 ¶ 6.
142
Id. Art. 22 ¶ 1.
143
Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 143.
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adhered to.144
Before 1994, GATT panels issued several relevant opinions
concerning Article XX exceptions, including Canadian Tuna,145
Canada—Herring and Salmon,146 Tuna—Dolphin I,147 and Tuna—
Dolphin II.148 Though these opinions did not occur under the auspices of
144
See Colm Patrick McInerney, From Shrimps and Dolphins to Retreaded Tyres: an
Overview of the World Trade Organization Disputes, Discussing Exceptions to Trading Rules, 22
N.Y. INT‟L L. REV. 153, 158 (2009).
145
Report of the Panel, United States – Prohibition of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada,
L/5198 - 29S/91 (Feb. 22, 1982), available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/ustuna.pdf.
Canadian Tuna addressed an import restriction issued by the United States in response to seizures of
its fishing fleets and arrests of American fishermen in Canadian waters. The United States claimed
its trestrictions were justified under U.N. law and therefore justified under Article XX(g). Id. at ¶
3.7-3.10. The panel found that the chapeau of Article XX was probably met because it was possible
that the discrimination by the United States was not arbitrary or unjustifiable, and that because the
measures had been publically announced they were not disguised restrictions. Id. The panel found
that the United States had not satisfied Article XX(g)‟s requirement that measures be made in
conjunction with domestic restrictions. Id.
146
Report of the Panel, Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and
Salmon, L/6268 - 35S/98 (Mar. 22, 1988), available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/
canadaherring.pdf. This case challenged a Canadian export restriction on unprocessed herring and
salmon, which Canada defended using Article XX(g) under the premise that Canada was trying to
preserve fish stocks. The Panel concluded that the measure was not primarily aimed at conservation,
but was instead aimed at protecting Canadian fish processing infrastructure and jobs, thus not
qualifying for an XX(g) exception. See Orzbirn, supra note 139, at 376; see also Ghei, supra note
49, at 135-36.
147
Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R - 39S/155
(Sept. 3, 1991), available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/tunadolphinI.pdf. This case
was initiated by Mexico in response to United States tuna import restrictions based in part on a
requirement of compliance with United States regulations under the Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA), which sought to reduce incidental killing of dolphins by commercial tuna fishing. Id. at ¶
2.3. The U.S. thus prohibited the import of yellow-fin tuna harvested with purse-seine nets unless the
government with jurisdiction over the fishing operation had in place a program comparable to the
MMPA and the average number of dolphins killed was comparable with the American fishing fleet.
Ozbirn, supra note 139, at 377. The GATT Panel agreed that MMPA rules violated Article XI and
adopted the argument that there was a jurisdictional limit on Article XX(g) that “was intended to
permit contracting parties to take trade measures primarily aimed at rendering effective restrictions
on production or consumption within their jurisdiction.” United States—Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, ¶ 5.31, DS21/R - 39S/155. The Panel also found that MMPA rules were too unpredictable
because the Mexican government would be unable to predict from year to year whether its program
was in compliance with the MMPA. The Panel gave no substantial rationale based in the language of
Article XX(g) or on GATT precedent for the conclusion that member states were not free to impose
restrictions extraterritorially under an Article XX(g) exception, but this limitation has not
subsequently been addressed by any other GATT or WTO decisional body, “which suggests that it
probably no longer applies.” Ozbirn, supra note 139, at 379. Additionally, Tuna—Dolphin II rejects
Tuna—Dolphin I‟s extraterritorial rationale.
148
Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R (June 16,
1994), available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/tunadolphinII.pdf. The last case
decided by a GATT Panel before the implementation of WTO provisions in 1994, was a combined
challenge by the European Economic Community and The Netherlands of an intermediary country
embargo enacted by the United States under a revised version of the MMPA. Again, Tuna-Dolphin
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the WTO and therefore lacked the enforcement mechanisms of the DSB,
they have often been cited as precedent and should probably be
considered persuasive, though not binding. Of additional interest is the
impact that these decisions had in establishing the perception that the
GATT panels exhibited an anti-environment bias. This perceived bias
galvanized environmental organizations and protests around the world
and may have pushed future WTO decisions in a more environmentally
friendly direction. Now, there is some evidence of a shift from an older,
pro-trade mentality to a more balanced approach that incorporates
competing interests and views Article XX exceptions on an equal footing
with the other, “substantive” provisions of GATT.149
B.

BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENT UNDER THE LAW OF THE WTO

A BTA aimed at balancing the costs to domestic industry of GHG
regulation would be considered a policy that restricts trade, because it
limits international access to domestic markets and so must comply with
the general provisions of GATT.150 These provisions include the
principles of nondiscrimination contained in the National Treatment and
Most Favored Nation provisions of Articles I and III. There are,
however, exceptions to these Articles, contained in Article XX, that
would allow discrimination under certain prescribed circumstances.
According to the Report of the Working Party on Border Tax
Adjustments, citing to the definition applied by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), BTAs are defined

II hinged on whether MMPA rules qualified for an Article XX(g) exception. The Panel found
explicitly that “a policy to conserve dolphins was a policy to conserve an exhaustible natural
resource,” Id. at ¶ 5.13. The Panel also found that Article XX(g) exceptions could apply extrajurisdictionally; the Panel concluded however, that the embargo was not related to conservation
because it was based on pressuring foreign governments into satisfying United States‟ conservation
goals of the United States. Id. at ¶ 5.24.
The panel also addressed process and production methods by stating that it was illegal under
GATT to discriminate between domestic and foreign- like products based on production methods.
See Halvorssen, supra note 88, at 376. Perhaps this case stands for the proposition that a measure
cannot be primarily aimed at conservation if another country must change its law or policies in order
to attain the conservation objective aimed at. See Ozbirn, supra note 139, at 380. It is important to
remember, however, that the two Tuna—Dolphin decisions were never adopted by the parties, or by
the GATT General Council, and that they do not have the status of a legal interpretation of GATT
law. See, e.g., the disclaimer at the top of the WTO‟s home page for the cases, available at
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis04_e.htm. As future cases will show, trade measures
aimed at coercing other countries into policy shifts have qualified as aimed at an appropriate
conservation purpose.
149
See McInerney, supra note 144, at 197-98.
150
See Hawkins, supra note 33, at 431.
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as any fiscal measures which put into effect, in whole or in part, the
destination principle (i.e. which enable exported products to be
relieved of some or all of the tax charged in the exporting country in
respect of similar domestic products sold to consumers on the home
market and which enable imported products sold to consumers to be
charged with some or all of the tax charged in the importing country in
151
respect of similar domestic products).

In general, the Working Party in 1970 expressed its satisfaction with the
overall trade neutrality of BTA rules and declined to recommend
changes.152
For purposes of WTO law, BTAs should be treated as two separate
regulatory regimes—one for exports and one for imports.153 The
Working Party pointed to GATT Articles II and III as particularly
important with respect to imports and GATT Article XVI as important to
exports.154 Specifically, GATT Article II:2 says that, in spite of basic
levels of customs duties established in Article II generally, states can
apply “a charge equivalent to an internal tax,” or, in other words, a BTA,
on the importation of any product.155 Article III says that measures
affecting international commerce cannot be applied so as to protect
domestic production by discriminating against imported products.156
GATT Article XVI expresses general disapproval for subsidies—
especially where they have harmful repercussions for GATT members—

151

Report of the Working Party, Border Tax Adjustments, ¶ 4, L/3464 (Dec. 2, 1970),
available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/bordertax.pdf. The Working Party also stated
that the term “border tax adjustment” could be confusing and should instead be referred to as “tax
adjustments applied to goods entering into international trade.” Id. at ¶ 5.
152
Id. at ¶ 9.
153
See id. at ¶ 7; see also OLE KRISTIAN FAUCHALD, ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES AND TRADE
DISCRIMINATION (1998).
154
Supra note 151, ¶ 7, L/3464.
155
GATT, supra note 16, Art. II ¶ 2(a).
156
Id. Art. III ¶¶ 1-4 (¶¶ 1-2 appear supra, note 111; ¶¶ 3-4 read “3. With respect to any
existing internal tax which is inconsistent with the provisions of paragraph 2, but which is
specifically authorized under a trade agreement, in force on April 10, 1947, in which the import duty
on the taxed product is bound against increase, the contracting party imposing the tax shall be free to
postpone the application of the provisions of paragraph 2 to such tax until such time as it can obtain
release from the obligations of such trade agreement in order to permit the increase of such duty to
the extent necessary to compensate for the elimination of the protective element of the tax. 4. The
products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting
party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national
origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent
the application of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the
economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product.”).
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and instructs signatories to avoid the use of subsidies where possible.157
In Japan—Alcohol, Japan‟s unequal taxation of shochu and vodka
was challenged as a violation of Article III(2). The WTO Appellate
Body, the highest decisional body countries can appeal WTO cases to,
concluded that
[r]ead in their context and in the light of the overall object and purpose
of the WTO Agreement . . . the words of the first sentence require an
examination of the conformity of an internal tax measure with Article
III by determining, first, whether the taxed imported and domestic
products are “like” and, second, whether the taxes applied to the
imported products are “in excess of” those applied to the like domestic
products. If the imported and domestic products are “like products”,
and if the taxes applied to the imported products are “in excess of”
those applied to the like domestic products, then the measure is
158
inconsistent with Article III:2, first sentence.

It is important to note that there is nothing in Article III that requires
importing countries to take the level of taxes applied domestically in the
exporting country into account, as this would be inconsistent with the
destination principle.
GATT Article III:1“informs Article III:2, second sentence, through
specific reference . . . [and] states that internal taxes and other internal
charges „should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to
afford protection to domestic production.‟”159 According to Goh, the
regulatory purpose and the intent of the measure or measures in question
are therefore relevant to an examination under Article III(2). One of the
dangers of affording such protection to domestic production is a double
tax penalty where producers have already paid energy taxes at home,
which could jeopardize competitive neutrality.160 This would not be the
case, however, if all countries followed the destination principle upon
which the WTO is predicated.
The following sections will address the specifics of BTA import and
export issues.

157

Id. Art. XVI ¶ 1.
Japan—Alcohol: Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 11, 1996
WL 910779 (Oct. 4, 1996).
159
Id. at 14.
160
Goh, supra note 15, at 411-12.
158
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BTAs for Exported Products

GATT Article XVI:4 prohibits a subsidy for a product where the
subsidy “results in the sale of such product for export at a price lower
than the comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in the
domestic market.”161 Prohibited subsidies allow countervailing duties to
be levied by the importing state up to the level of the prohibited subsidy
under GATT Article VI:3. Specifically allowing BTAs for exports,
Article VI:4 provides that such countervailing duties cannot be levied as
a result of the exemption of exported products from taxes (or the refund
of such taxes) on like products destined for domestic consumption in the
country of origin.162
Article VI:4 of GATT makes it clear that exported products can be
freed from domestic taxes through a BTA mechanism.163 This principle
tends to hold true in both GATT and European Community rules, where
taxes on products, or indirect taxes, are usually eligible for adjustment,
while taxes on producers, or direct taxes, are not.164 This makes BTAs
for exported products a relatively simple proposition for governments to
institute with the assurance that they are not going to run afoul of WTO
subsidy law.165 These types of tax adjustments—remissions, really—do
not qualify as subsidies at all.166
Domestic GHG regulations tend to address product inputs as well as
final products, somewhat complicating the export BTA picture. The
SCM Agreement permits the remission of taxes on prior stage inputs,
including those inputs normally consumed during production such as

161

The rules on subsidies are a little bit more flexible for primary products, meaning mainly
the products of fishing, forestry, agriculture, and mineral exploitation.
162
GATT, supra note 16, Art. VI ¶ 4 (“No product of the territory of any contracting party
imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be subject to anti-dumping or
countervailing duty by reason of the exemption of such product from duties or taxes borne by the
like product when destined for consumption in the country of origin or exportation, or by reason of
the refund of such duties or taxes.”).
163
GATT, supra note 16, Art. VI ¶ 4 states that “[n]o product of the territory of any
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be subject to antidumping or countervailing duty by reason of the exemption of such product from duties or taxes
borne by the like product when destined for consumption in the country of origin or exportation, or
by reason of the refund of such duties or taxes.” Additionally, Note Ad for GATT Article XVI states
that “[t]he exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the like product when
destined for domestic consumption, or the remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess
of those which have accrued, shall not be deemed to be a subsidy.”
164
Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 7.
165
Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 144-45; see also Green & Epps, supra note 135, at 293.
166
GATT, supra note 16, Ad Art. XVI.
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energy, fuels, oil, and catalysts.167 Roland Ismer and Karsten Neuhoff
argue that GHG allowances or permits should qualify as prior stage
inputs rather than as government services because the benefit of the
GHG reduction program primarily benefits the wider community rather
than individual businesses.168
One thesis of this Article is that costs related to the regulation of
GHG-producing inputs such as energy or fuel oil are eligible for
adjustment without being classified as a prohibited export subsidy.169 In
defining what can be classified as an export subsidy, the SCM
Agreement states that “prior stage cumulative indirect taxes may be
exempted, remitted or deferred on exported products even when not
exempted, remitted or deferred on like products when sold for domestic
consumption, if the prior stage cumulative indirect taxes are levied on
inputs that are consumed in the production of the exported product.”170
The SCM Agreement further explains that “[i]nputs consumed in the
production process are inputs physically incorporated, energy, fuels and
oil used in the production process and catalysts which are consumed in
the course of their use to obtain the exported product.”171 A broad
reading of the SCM Agreement would thus include most kinds of
domestic GHG regulatory costs.
There are arguments for a more narrow reading of the SCM
Agreement. There has been significant discussion concerning the abovequoted clauses in the SCM Agreement because these clauses appear to
broaden the scope of BTAs, a conclusion that seems preposterous to
some.172 As noted above, the SCM Agreement allows “prior stage
cumulative indirect taxes” for inputs consumed in the production
process; “prior stage indirect taxes” are defined as “those levied on
goods or services used directly or indirectly in making the product,”
while “cumulative indirect taxes” are defined as “multi staged taxes

167

SCM Agreement, Annex 1(h) (1994), available at www.wto.org/english/docs_
e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#tbt; Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 144.
168
Id. Ismer and Neuhoff also make the argument that free allocation of permits would reduce
the overall effectiveness of a BTA by lowering the domestic cost of GHG regulations. Id.
169
See Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 29 (noting that it has been argued that
“specific taxes on energy, fuel or oil used in the production process should also be eligible for
adjustment on the export of the final product”).
170
SCM Agreement, Annex I: Illustrative List of Export Subsidies (h) (1994).
171
Id. at Annex II n.61.This particular footnote has been the subject of quite a bit of debate,
not the least of which involves a “gentlemen‟s agreement” whereby countries agreed not to use this
clause to adjust energy or carbon taxes. Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 30. While
countries may follow such an agreement, there is no indication that a WTO decisional body would
treat it as anything more than an interesting historical note. See id.
172
See, e.g., BRACK ET AL., supra note 18, at 85-7.
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levied where there is no mechanism for subsequent crediting of the tax if
the goods or services subject to tax at one stage of production are used in
a succeeding stage of production.”173 Common sense and the plain
meaning of this definition, in spite of potential linguistic difficulties
between the equally official French and English versions, should include
BTAs for GHG inputs: GHG-producing activities are used directly or
indirectly in making the products to which a GHG-based BTA would
apply.
Thus, the main problem must be with the definition of
“cumulative.” However, because taxes on GHG inputs must build upon
one another in order to be effective, GHG-input taxes would occur at
multiple stages in the production process—at the very least applying to
inputs for energy and various raw materials. There is no proposed
method for crediting succeeding stages of GHG-taxed production with
the costs of the GHG taxes on previous stages, a process that would fit
the definition of “cumulative” as it is used in the SCM Agreement. It
seems likely that this language was purely designed to exclude Value
Added Taxes—for which products are credited at each succeeding level
of production—and is not applicable to GHG-related BTAs.
However broad the language in the SCM Agreement may appear to
be, some still argue that the negotiators at the Uruguay Round were
attempting to limit the application of BTAs to certain energy intensive
exports from developed countries and had no intention of allowing BTA
for energy taxes in general.174 Because of these arguments, it is possible
that a WTO decisional body will interpret “prior stage cumulative
indirect taxes” narrowly to encompass only specific types of cascade
taxes. Though this is the conclusion reached by the WTO Secretariat,175
as well as by some commentators in this area, there has been no definite
conclusion by a WTO decisional body that taxes on inputs not physically
present in the final product cannot be adjusted for. Rather, such “original
intent” arguments are not generally considered persuasive by
international decisional bodies. Instead, international law adheres closely
to rules of treaty interpretation that state that a “treaty shall be interpreted
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose,” as laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of

173

SCM Agreement, Annex 1 n.58.
See, e.g., BRACK ET AL., supra note 18, at 86-87; Note by the Secretariat, Taxes and
Charges for Environmental Purposes – Border Tax Adjustment, ¶ 76, WT/CTE/W/47 (May 2, 1997).
175
Note by the Secretariat, supra note 174, ¶ 76.
174
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Treaties.176 Only where the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous or obscure
is recourse to be given to works relating to the preparation of the treaty
and the original intent of the treaty‟s negotiators.177 Indeed, as discussed
below, in United States—Superfund a GATT Panel declined to
distinguish a BTA on the basis of a physical incorporation standard and
allowed export adjustment for chemicals that had been used in the
production process but were not present in the final product. Though this
case was decided before the SPS Agreement was instituted in 1994, it
provides a precedent for a broader reading. Significantly, it also shows
that a broader reading of the 1994 SPS Agreement, such as that in United
States—Superfund, would not broaden the scope of GATT‟s subsidy
regulations to include export BTAs for substances not incorporated into a
final product.
ii.

BTAs for Imported Products

The analysis of BTAs on imports has two parts. First, the National
Treatment Principle, referred to earlier, states that foreign producers
must be treated the same as domestic producers for like, competitive, or
substitutable products.178 This means that like products must be taxed
similarly (though not necessarily identically).179 It is a violation of GATT
to protect domestic production through discriminatory taxation.180
A BTA measure must thus be relatively exact in the calculation of
domestic charges to be applied to imports. In fact, the Working Party
notes that “countries adjusting taxes, should, at all times, be prepared, if
requested, to account for the reasons for adjustment, for the methods

176

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 31(1), 23 May 1969, available at
untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/.../conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.
177
Id. at Art. 32.
178
See GATT, supra note 16, Art. III ¶ 2 (“The products of the territory of any contracting
party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly
or indirectly, to like domestic products.”); see also GATT Art. III ¶ 1 (“contracting parties recognize
that internal taxes and other internal charges . . . should not be applied to imported or domestic
products so as to afford protection to domestic production.”).
179
“A formal difference in treatment between imported and like domestic products is thus
neither necessary, nor sufficient, to show a violation of Article III:4. Whether or not imported
products are treated „less favourably‟ than like domestic products should be assessed instead by
examining whether a measure modifies the conditions of competition in the relevant market to the
detriment of imported products.” Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Import of
Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 137, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000),
available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds161_e.htm.
180
See Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 148-49.
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used, for the amount of compensation and to furnish proof thereof.”181
Thus, a well-crafted BTA ties the calculation of border adjustments to
the levels of domestic taxes, especially where domestic taxes can
fluctuate over time.
Second, the Most Favored Nation Principle means any advantage
with respect to border restrictions granted to an exporting country must
also be granted to all exporters of similar, or like, products.182 In other
words, a BTA measure would have to apply equally no matter which
country produced a particular product. This poses problems for BTAs
that discriminate between importing countries on the basis of their GHG
regulation, as many proposed BTAs do. Therefore, as will be discussed
in greater detail later on, BTAs must either (1) be promulgated on the
basis that products produced without GHG regulation are not like
physically identical products produced with such regulation, or (2)
specifically tax GHG emissions themselves as product inputs.
A GATT Panel decision, United States—Superfund, explains the
requirements of Article III in the context of BTAs.183 In order to fund the
cleanup of hazardous waste sites, the United States imposed BTAs on
certain chemicals and on products produced or manufactured using those
chemicals.184 The Panel concluded that the tax imposed by the United
States was
imposed on the imported substances because they are produced from
chemicals subject to an excise tax in the United States and the tax rate
is determined in principle in relation to the amount of these chemicals
used and not in relation to the value of the imported substance. The
Panel therefore concluded that, to the extent that the tax on certain
imported substances was equivalent to the tax borne by like domestic
substances as a result of the tax on certain chemicals the tax met the
185
national treatment requirement of Article III:2, first sentence.

Thus the Panel concluded that GATT allowed import BTAs for product
inputs subject to an internal tax.186
181

Report of the Working Party, Border Tax Adjustments, ¶ 17, L/3464 (Dec. 2, 1970),
available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/bordertax.pdf.
182
GATT, supra note 16, Art. I ¶ 1.
183
Report of the Panel, United States—Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances,
¶ 2.1, L/6175 - 34S/136 (June 17, 1987), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/gt47ds_e.htm.
184
Id.
185
Id. at ¶ 5.2.8 (emphasis added).
186
Goh, supra note 15, at 412. But see Green & Epps, supra note 135, at 293 (agreeing that
United States—Superfund contained too much uncertainty about whether chemicals were present in
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Which domestic charges can be applied to imports hinges on
whether those charges are direct or indirect with respect to the
producer.187 The Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments decided
“that there was convergence of views to the effect that taxes directly
levied on products [not on producers] were eligible for tax adjustment.
Examples of such taxes comprised specific excise duties, sales taxes and
cascade taxes and the tax on value added.”188 Additionally, “certain taxes
that were not directly levied on products [but rather on producers] were
not eligible for tax adjustment. Examples of such taxes comprised social
security charges whether on employers or employees and payroll
taxes.”189 Thus, much of the debate surrounding BTAs revolves around
the classification of the adjustment as either direct or indirect. GATT
tends to follow the destination principle where indirect taxes are
concerned and the origin principle (taxation of products where they are
produced) where direct taxes on producers are concerned.190
Unfortunately, if not unsurprisingly, the Working Party did not
address the kind of energy and other GHG-related inputs that a BTA
targeted at climate change would encompass.191 Indeed, the Working
Party seemed to suggest that the whole direct/indirect distinction was
economically inexplicable, stating that “the economic basis for such a
clear distinction between indirect and direct taxes for adjustment
purposes has not been demonstrated.”192 Some of the Working Party
concluded that the distinction was based more on the relative purpose of
the tax—either the tax was directed toward internal consumption in
keeping with the destination principle (indirect, and thus BTA eligible)
or toward entrepreneurs‟ profits and personal income (direct, and thus
BTA ineligible).193 This line of reasoning has borne little fruit in WTO
and GATT decisions, however, even though the balance of opinion
seems to hold that the structure of the market, business cycles, and other

the final products to give the case strong precedential value where inputs are not apparent in the final
product).
187
Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 146.
188
Report of the Working Party, Border Tax Adjustments, ¶ 14, L/3464 (Dec. 2, 1970),
available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/bordertax.pdf.
189
Id.
190
Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 8-9. Remember, the origin principle states that
taxes should be applied where a particular good is produced, while the destination principle states
that taxes should be applied where a particular good is sold.
191
See, supra note 188, ¶ 15(a). In fact, the Working Party concluded that the importance of
such taxes in the context of BTAs “was not such as to justify further examination.” Id. at ¶ 15. It
appears that times have changed.
192
Id. at ¶ 21.
193
Id.
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economic conditions have more to do with what kinds of taxes get passed
along to consumers than the direct/indirect classification.194 Paul
Demaret and Raoul Stewardson conclude that, for practical and
administrative reasons, however, there is no real prospect of the
distinction between direct and indirect taxes being abandoned in favor of
a more accurate system of classification.195 In spite of this balance of
opinion, the apparent economic rationale now used to describe the
distinction between direct and indirect taxation is that direct taxes are not
passed along to consumers, while indirect taxes are.
A GATT Panel report in 1976, United States—DISC, reinforced the
distinction between direct and indirect taxes.196 The Panel in United
States—DISC held that the refund by the United States of direct taxes on
exports was a subsidy in violation of GATT obligations.197 The 1994
SCM Agreement includes some relevant definitions in this context:
The term “direct taxes” shall mean taxes on wages, profits, interests,
rents, royalties, and all other forms of income, and taxes on the
ownership of real property; . . . The term “indirect taxes” shall mean
sales, excise, turnover, value added, franchise, stamp, transfer,
inventory and equipment taxes, border taxes and all taxes other than
198
direct taxes and import charges. . . . .

Ismer and Neuhoff argue that the wording of Article II “does not
indicate that the clause actually seeks to disallow tax adjustment at the
border,” leading them to conclude that the symmetric treatment of
imports and exports warrants BTAs for things like energy inputs.199 The
argument for symmetric treatment is supported by its simplicity, by the
Article I phrase “originating in or destined for,”200 by the coherent and
efficient application of the destination principle upon which GATT was
based, and by its consequent avoidance of trade distortions such as
double taxation and non-taxation.201
While it is at least somewhat accepted that BTAs are allowed for
194

Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 15.
Id. at 15-16.
196
Report of the Panel, United States Tax Legislation, L/4422 - 23S/98 (Nov. 12, 1976),
available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/usdisc.pdf.
197
Id. at ¶ 72.
198
SCM Agreement, Annex I n.58 (1994), available at www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/
legal_e.htm#tbt.
199
Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 146-47; see also Veel, supra note 32, at 774.
200
OLE KRISTIAN FAUCHALD, ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES AND TRADE DISCRIMINATION (1998).
201
Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 147; see also Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at
31.
195
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taxes levied on physically incorporated inputs,202 various commentators
have come down on both sides of the question of how to classify
adjustments for different kinds of non-physically incorporated GHGrelated input taxes. The argument that energy inputs, for instance, cannot
be adjusted for seems to revolve around the language of GATT Article
II:2, which states that adjustments can be made “in respect of an article
from which the imported product has been manufactured in whole or in
part.”203
According to this argument, energy cannot be regarded as an
“article” at all, especially not one from which a product has been
manufactured. Rather, the word “article” should be applicable only to
ingredients physically incorporated in the final product. However, this
interpretation is open to debate, especially as the word “article” can mean
a distinct member of a class of things, such as a unit of energy.204 The
French can also be translated indifferent ways, as “goods,” or maybe
even as “commodities,” which under a modern understanding of trade
could certainly include energy or other GHG-producing activities. All of
this linguistic argumentation is merely by way of saying that, while
WTO decisional bodies could use this sort of analysis to exclude socalled intangible production ingredients, they have not done so thus far
and seem inclined, rather, to take the simpler expedient of allowing
BTAs for all types of inputs.205
A WTO Panel implicitly addressed some issues related to BTAs for
product inputs in Argentina—Hides and Leather.206 The European
Community brought a complaint against Argentina for a value-added tax
of nine percent on imported leather products.207 In its analysis the Panel
concluded that “a determination of whether an infringement of Article
III:2, first sentence, exists must be made on the basis of an overall
assessment of the actual tax burdens imposed on imported products, on
the one hand, and like domestic products, on the other hand.”208
Furthermore, in supporting this conclusion, the Panel cited language
202

See supra note 23, at 20; see also BRACK ET AL., supra note 18, at 84-85.
GATT, supra note 16, Art. II ¶ 2. Or, from the French text, “une merchandise qui a été
incorporée dans l‟article importé.” Id.
204
“article (är´tĭ-ekel) n. Abbr. art. “1. An individual thing in a class; item . . . 6. A particular
part or subject; a point or specific matter.” HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY, THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 74 (William Morris ed. 1978).
205
See Green & Epps, supra note 135, at 292.
206
Report of the Panel, Argentina—Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the
Import of Finished Leather, WT/DS155/R (Dec. 19, 2000), available at www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds155_e.htm.
207
Id. at ¶ 1.1.
208
Id. at ¶ 11.184.
203
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from Japan—Alcohol stating that all tax burdens, including “indirect
taxation by taxing the raw materials used in the product during the
various stages of its production,” must be taken into account.209 Because
the Panel focused on “raw materials used in the product,” it implicitly
acknowledged the possibility of BTAs on non-physically incorporated
product inputs.210
There is a potential distinction to be made between product inputs
and the byproducts of product manufacturing. Veel points out this
distinction, noting that “emissions allowances in the [European Union
Emissions Trading System] and the Lieberman-Warner Bill are not
charges on „articles from which the imported product has been
manufactured,‟ but rather are charges on by-products of the
manufacturing process.”211 However, this is likely drawing too fine a
distinction on a somewhat confusing aspect of WTO jurisprudence—
especially when taken in conjunction with GATT Article XX‟s
investigation of the purpose of a given trade measure.212 The technical
wording of GATT Article II:2 can indeed be used to draw the distinction
underlined by Veel, but the purpose of the sections in question is to allow
countries to impose BTAs rather than to govern the purpose or policy
behind any particular border measure (unlike GATT Article XX, which
explicitly investigates the purpose of a trade measure). It did not matter
why Argentina was taxing any particular leather input in Argentina—
Hides and Leather, just as it does not matter why the European Union
might decide to tax energy or any other raw material at a particular rate.
What matters, rather, is that domestic products are not given better tax

209

Id. at ¶ 11.183 (citing Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, ¶
5.8, 1996 WL 910779 (Oct. 4, 1996)).
210
See Green & Epps, supra note 135, at 293 (stating that Argentina—Hides and Leather
“provides some support for BTAs on production inputs not incorporated in the final product”).
211
Veel, supra note 32, at 774 (quoting GATT Art. II ¶ 2(a)).
212
See GATT, supra note 16, Art. XX ¶¶ (a)-(i) (“Subject to the requirement that such
measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination . . . nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any contracting party of measures: (a) necessary to protect public morals; (b)
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; (c) relating to the importations or
exportations of gold or silver; (d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement . . . (e) relating to the products of prison
labour; (f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological
value; (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption; (h) undertaken in
pursuance of obligations under any intergovernmental commodity agreement . . . (i) involving
restrictions on exports of domestic materials necessary to ensure essential quantities of such
materials to a domestic processing industry during periods when the domestic price of such materials
is held below the world price as part of a governmental stabilization plan. . . .”).
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treatment than imported products, and the purpose to which that tax
treatment is applied is mostly irrelevant.
Indeed, Gavin Goh concludes that “[e]nergy tax adjustments at the
border would be permitted under Article III:2 so long as the „actual tax
burden‟ on with respect to taxes applied on inputs was not in excess of
that on the like domestic good.”213 The broad definition of overall tax
burdens, he reasons, acknowledges that adjustments can be made for
production inputs to finished products.214 Goh cautions that the language
of Article III:2 may support an alternate view—one that holds that only
those taxes applied directly to the finished product, and not inputs to that
product, can be applied to imported products. Specifically, the line
“directly or indirectly” could apply
more to the manner of application of the tax, as opposed to the nature
of the tax itself. To interpret the term „applied . . . indirectly, to‟
products as including taxes applied on other products used in the
production of the imported and domestic goods at issue would extend
215
the term beyond its ordinary meaning.

However, this argument seems to be contradicted by the 1970 Working
Party.216 In noting that there was some difference in the language used to
describe taxes levied on imports and exports, the Working Party
concluded that “differences in wording had not led to any differences in
interpretation of the provisions . . . GATT provisions on tax adjustment
applied the principle of destination identically to imports and exports.”217
Goh‟s argument consequently has been rejected as well by the majority
of WTO decisional law and commentary.
If, contrary to the above analysis, a given BTA scheme is not in
compliance with the substantive portions of GATT, it is possible that the
scheme could be justified under GATT Article XX. Article XX
213

Goh, supra note 15, at 406.
Id. However, Goh presents a counter-argument that would prohibit BTAs for PPMs by
suggesting that the relevant basis of comparison between like domestic and imported products is
actually the taxes applied to final products rather than the taxes applied to product inputs or
manufacturing processes. The basis for this argument, however, is the wording of Article III:2—Goh
claims that PPM taxes are “borne by” domestic products, while BTAs are “applied to” imported
products, and that this distinction in the language of GATT leads to his final product distinction. Id.
It seems unlikely that a WTO decisional body would reach so fine a distinction on the basis of
ambiguous language when the WTO has yet to show any inclination to micromanage BTA measures
to the extent suggested by Goh.
215
Id. at 410.
216
Report of the Working Party, Border Tax Adjustments, ¶ 10, L/3464 (Dec. 2, 1970),
available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/bordertax.pdf.
217
Id.
214
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exceptions are covered in depth later in this analysis, in sections II.C. and
II.D.
C.

GATT JURISPRUDENCE CONCERNING “LIKE” PRODUCT ANALYSIS

Products that are not considered either “like” or “competing” under
the language of GATT Article III can be taxed at different rates without
any danger of WTO repercussions. Thus governments often find it
valuable to attempt to distinguish between products, especially when
seeking to further other policy goals such as protecting the environment
or human rights. For instance, an environmentally minded government
may wish to tax organically produced bananas at a lower rate than
bananas produced using standard agricultural practices, even though
organic bananas may be competing with, or are “like,” regular bananas.
Until recently, however, WTO decisional law has not tended to support
distinctions drawn on the basis of production methods.218
Moreover, not just identical but also “competing” imported products
are considered “like” for the purposes of GATT Article III. The
Appellate Body‟s ruling in Asbestos showed that the test for
competitiveness should take place in an idealized marketplace where
consumers have relevant information.219 Also relevant is GATT Note Ad
Article III, which states that a measure affecting imported competing
products is inconsistent with Article III “only in cases where competition
was involved between, on the one hand, the taxed product and, on the
other hand, a directly competitive or substitutable product which was not
similarly taxed.”220 The important distinction here is whether a tax on
imports tends to protect competing domestic products, whether or not
those imports are taxed the same as like domestic products.221
The WTO adopted the definitive test for product likeness in Japan—
Alcohol.222 Japan—Alcohol concerned shochu and vodka, not identical

218

Indeed, Dominic Gentile concludes that “products produced in an environmentally
unfriendly manner cannot be treated differently than products produced in an environmentally
friendly manner on the sole basis of the difference in process or production method.” Gentile, supra
note 31, at 7207. However, Gentile‟s conclusion was largely based on the Panel decision in Tuna—
Dolphin I, a decision that has been largely marginalized by later Appellate Body decisions, such as
the Shrimp—Turtle series of cases. This will be addressed later on in this Article, when GATT
Article XX(g) is discussed in detail.
219
See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 122, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), available at
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds135_e.htm; see also Green, supra note 30, at 159.
220
GATT, supra note 16, Note Ad Article III.
221
Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 35.
222
See Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 146.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol3/iss2/3

42

Eichenberg: Greenhouse Gas Regulation
03_B. EICHENBERG PRINTER VERSION

5/22/2010 11:27 AM

2010] GREENHOUSE GASES AND BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS 325
products but nonetheless considered to serve the same end uses. Thus,
the differential treatment of shochu and vodka served protectionist
purposes.223 In this case, the Appellate Body construed the language of
GATT Article III:2 narrowly, considering the various characteristics of
the products in each case.224 According to the Appellate Body, likeness
“must be determined by the particular provision in which the term „like‟
is encountered as well as by the context and the circumstances that
prevail in any given case to which that provision may apply.”225 In the
case of Article III, a somewhat precise (because it involves nonexclusive factors) six-factor test was set forth to determine likeness: (1)
whether the two products share the same physical characteristics, (2) the
similarity of the two products‟ properties, (3) the functional likeness of
the two products‟ natures and qualities, (4) whether the two products
have similar end uses in a given market, (5) consumers‟ tastes and habits
with regard to distinguishing the two products and willingness to
substitute one for the other, and (6) the tariff classification of the
products.226
Later cases showed that the size of the producer was irrelevant to
likeness determinations, even if small foreign producers were given
similar preferential treatment to small domestic producers.227 In United
States—Malt Beverages Panel, the Panel also implied that the origins of
a product‟s ingredients are not sufficiently distinctive to allow
preferential tax treatment.228 Whether products were being distinguished
for protectionist purposes was, again, important to this decision.229
Where BTAs for GHG-related product inputs are concerned, the
most obvious objects of a like-product analysis are final products rather
than the raw materials used during manufacture.230 Inputs such as energy
and fuel do not tend to show up in the physical properties of the final
product, making it difficult to classify products as unlike based solely on
223

Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 36.
See Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 13, 1996 WL 910779
(Oct. 4, 1996).
225
Id. at 12.
226
Id. at 20-23; see also Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 146; Report of the Working Party,
Border Tax Adjustments, ¶ 18, L/3464 (Dec. 2, 1970), available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/
gattpanels/bordertax.pdf (stating that the determination should be based on “the product‟s end-uses
in a given market; consumers‟ tastes and habits, which change from country to country; the
product‟s properties, nature and quality”).
227
See, e.g., Report of the Panel, United States: Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt
Beverages, ¶ 5.6, 1992 WL 799397 (Mar. 16, 1992).
228
Id. at ¶ 5.22.
229
See Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 38.
230
Goh, supra note 15, at 407.
224
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GHGs emitted during production.231 The only one of the criteria for
distinguishing products, enumerated earlier, that might conceivably
apply is consumer perceptions and differentiation. Most commentators,
however, conclude that consumer differentiation on these grounds is
unlikely to be argued and difficult to prove.232
i.

Environmental Process and Production Methods

Distinguishing like or competing products on the basis of the
process or production method (PPM) used to produce that product is
another important arena where BTAs for GHG inputs will be tested. This
is because GHG regulation tends to target the manner in which products
are produced rather than specific final products, whereas GATT tends to
focus on the final product. Thus, debate about whether GATT prohibits
regulation on the basis of PPMs could be central to any discussion of
compatibility between climate-centered regulation and the WTO.233
The TBT Agreement established regulations concerning PPMs.234
Essentially, regulations on a product‟s specifications, such as size or
weight, are not PPM-based regulations, while regulations concerning the
methods used to make the product are PPM-based regulations.235 PPMs
are often distinguished by referring to them as either product-related or
product-unrelated, based on whether the PPM regulation in question is
related to the physical functionality of the product. One example of a
product-related PPM regulation would be a measure requiring processbased sanitary conditions in the handling of imported meat products.236
Non-product-related PPMs encompass measures addressing issues like
labor standards and environmental protection. It is PPM-based
regulations, and further, non-product-related PPMs, that tend to be the
most controversial.237

231

Id. at 407-08.
Id. Goh points out that the regulatory creation of consumer differentiation may trigger
WTO review of whether the regulation has a protectionist purpose, with the implication being that
such purpose could invalidate an argument that imported products are not like domestic products.
See also Hawkins, supra note 33, at 434.
233
THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 12.
234
TBT Agreement, supra note 133.
235
Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental ―PPMs‖ in the WTO: Debunking the Myth
of Illegality, 27 YALE J. INT‟L L. 59, 64-65 (2002) (“For example, a law prohibiting the landing of
fish caught using a driftnet is a PPM. By contrast, a law prohibiting the sale of fish smaller than a
prescribed size is not a PPM.”).
236
See id.
237
See Goh, supra note 15, at 402 (“it is less clear whether Article III:2 permits border tax
adjustments on a final product for taxes applied on inputs, such as energy, used in the production
232
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While BTAs in general are quite common, BTAs based on PPMs
are rarer.238 Most commentators believe that PPMs are irrelevant for
likeness determinations under GATT Article III, and that the WTO
judiciary shares this view.239 If this is true, then PPM-based measures
would need to qualify for one of the GATT Article XX exceptions in
order to be WTO-compliant.
On the other hand, others have argued that Shrimp—Turtle opened
the door for states to distinguish otherwise like products on the basis of
process and production methods.240 In Shrimp—Turtle, the Appellate
Body upheld an import ban predicated on the level of environmental
protection in shrimp-exporting countries.241 In other words, the PPM
used to produce the shrimp was held to be sufficient basis for trade
measures. If this is so, products produced without GHG regulation could
be distinguished from products produced with GHG regulation and taxed
however a particular country wanted to, without running afoul of GATT
Article I or III. In spite of the optimism surrounding Shrimp—Turtle,
however, it is important to notice the complexity of PPM issues and the
ease with which an open-ended reading of the “like product” language in
the WTO agreements could be turned to protectionist purposes—and the
wariness with which any WTO decisional body would confront the
possibility of protectionist behavior. Also, Shrimp—Turtle involved
GATT Article XX, which (as explained in detail below) gives a WTO
decisional body more leeway to rein in disguised protectionist measures.
There have been some limited examples of PPM-based BTAs, such
as a tax levied by the United States on ozone-depleting chemicals
process”).
238
BRACK ET AL., supra note 18, at 76.
239
Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 148; see also Green, supra note 30, at 161-63 (“The
general view has been that PPMs requirements based on the energy efficiency or emissions of the
method of processing or production will not be found to comply with GATT.”); Zhang & Assunção,
supra note 33, at 380 (“[i]t would appear that such BTA adjustments for imports on the basis of their
MPPMs is in direct conflict with the GATT/WTO principles”); Green &Epps, supra note 135, at
292.
240
See, e.g., Halvorssen, supra note 88, at 376; see also THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at
12 (in Shrimp—Turtle, the WTO “may have opened the doors to the permissibility of trade measures
based on PPMs”).
241
Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 21, 2001),
available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm. In an effort to protect sea
turtles, the United States issued regulations under Section 609 of the Endangered Species Act to
require both domestic and foreign programs to prevent accidental sea turtle deaths as a result of
shrimp-harvesting practices, primarily through the inclusion of Turtle Excluder Devices. Id. at ¶ 3.
Countries that did not enact regulations at least as effective as the regulations in the United States at
preventing sea turtle deaths could not import their shrimp into markets in the United States. Id. at ¶
5.
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(ODCs). The ODC tax was instituted to accomplish obligations incurred
by the United States under the 1987 Montreal Protocol, applied to
chemicals proportionally to their ozone-depleting potential, and
increased every year.242 BTAs were applied to all products produced
using ODCs, including ODCs used only for cleaning purposes and not
present in the final product.243 If actual consumption of ODCs was not
reported, predominant production methods in the United States were
used to estimate the tax for each particular product.244 WTO approval of
such taxes, and of the use of predominant production methods to
determine tax levels, highlights an important methodology for the
implementation of GHG-based BTAs.
Another example of a PPM-based BTA was a tax levied by the
United States to fund the cost of hazardous waste cleanup. In United
States—Superfund, a WTO Panel in 1987 decided a suit brought against
the United States by Mexico, Canada, and the European Economic
Community (EEC) because of taxes imposed on specific imported
chemicals to further such cleanups.245 The measure enacted by the United
States, termed an environmental excise tax, included a tax on imported
products based on the amount of domestically taxable chemicals used
during production.246 If relevant PPM information was not supplied by
importers, the United States Treasury used predominant production
methods employed in the United States to determine the rate of tax.247
Because the tax was based on the process used to make the product
rather than on the physical characteristics of the product itself, it
represented a true PPM-based BTA.248
Citing the report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments,
the Panel in United States—Superfund held that
[w]hether a sales tax is levied on a product for general revenue
purposes or to encourage the rational use of environmental resources,
is . . . not relevant for the determination of the eligibility of a tax for
border tax adjustment . . . The tax on certain chemicals, being a tax

242

BRACK ET AL., supra note 18, at 78.
Id. at 79.
244
Id.
245
Panel Report, United States—Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, ¶ 1.1,
L/6175 - 34S/136 (June 5, 1987), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gt47ds_e.htm.
246
Id. at ¶¶ 2.1-2.6.
247
Id. at ¶ 2.4.
248
BRACK ET AL., supra note 18, at 77.
243
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directly imposed on products, was eligible for border tax adjustment
249
independent of the purpose it served.

In other words, so long as the tax was applied to imports at a level
not higher than equivalent charges applied to domestic producers, it was
irrelevant that the BTA was aimed at environmental PPMs—the
important point was that the tax adjustment was determined in relation to
the amount of chemicals used.250 This reasoning is especially important
for analysis of GHG-based BTAs and the Most Favored Nation clause of
GATT Article I because it is irrelevant that such BTAs are targeted at
specific countries with weak GHG regulations. United States—Superfund
shows that what is important is that the tax adjustment be calculated in
respect to the amount of GHG produced.
According to some, United States—Superfund raised serious
questions that might, in turn, apply to other PPM-based environmental
regulation, such as a BTA for GHGs.251 Little effort was made to
specifically address the PPM issue in United States—Superfund, as the
Panel lumped PPM-related taxes in with the other taxes at issue in the
case. Another objection that has since been raised to the decision in
United States—Superfund is that the requirement for foreign firms to
provide commercial and proprietary information about the methods used
to produce their products risked the exposure of sensitive information to
competitors. Final objections to United States—Superfund include the
danger of double taxation and the potential violation of “polluter pays”
principles since foreign firms are being asked to pay for pollution that
they did not necessarily cause.252
D.

GATT ARTICLE XX EXCEPTIONS

Article XX of GATT and its ten subdivisions contain ten specific
exceptions that allow measures that might otherwise violate one of the

249

United States—Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, ¶ 5.2.4, L/6175 -

34S/136.
250

“The Panel accepted the US argument that GATT 1947 contemplated the possibility for
border tax adjustments in respect of imported products that contained substances subject to an
internal tax.” Goh, supra note 15, at 403-04.
251
See, e.g., BRACK ET AL., supra note 18, at 77-81; Goh, supra note 15, at 404-15.
252
Goh, supra note 15, at 404-05. It must be pointed out, though, that Goh portrays the
“polluter pays” principle as an assumption that the polluter has already paid, a bit of a stretch
considering the state of world environmental regulation. Later, Goh even contradicts his earlier
caution when he states that a BTA on energy inputs would correspond to the “polluter pays”
principle because polluters would be taxed irrespective of where their goods were produced. Id. at
415.
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articles of GATT. These exceptions generally address trade issues vital
to the sovereignty of GATT member states or issues that are considered
basic tenets of international human rights. There are two parts to an
Article XX analysis: the subdivisions, and the chapeau,253 or first
paragraph.254 For climate-related BTAs, only subdivisions (b) and (g) are
directly relevant.255 Relevant to environmental concerns, Article XX(b)
states that GATT shall not interfere with measures “necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health,”256 and Article XX(g) excepts
measures “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption.”257 The chapeau of Article XX has
two basic requirements: (1) that “measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,”
and (2) that such measures not be “a disguised restriction on international
trade.”258 According to the Appellate Body in Shrimp—Turtle, the
chapeau of Article XX “must be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of
contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection
and conservation of the environment.”259 Though not explicitly
applicable to the whole WTO, this language from Shrimp—Turtle can be
read to imply that contemporary standards of interpretation should apply
to all of the subdivisions of Article XX.260
i.

GATT Article XX(b)

GATT Article XX(b) implicitly adheres to its own two-part
structure: (1) making sure that the measure in question protects human,
animal, or plant life or health; and (2) making sure that the measure is
necessary. “Necessary” has been interpreted to mean that the trade

253
“Chapeau” means “hat” or “cap” in French. www.french-linguistics.co.uk/dictionary/
englishfrench/.
254
This two-step approach was applied by the WTO in Reformulated Gasoline, Shrimp—
Turtle, and Asbestos, as will be described below. See also Ghei, supra note 49, at 119; Ismer &
Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 149-50.
255
Id. at 149; see also Goh, supra note 15, at 414; see also THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13,
at 37.
256
GATT, supra note 16, Art. XX(b).
257
Id. Art. XX(g).
258
Id. Art. XX.
259
Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, ¶ 129, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm.
260
Goh, supra note 15, at 414.
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measure in question must be the least trade-restrictive measure possible
under the circumstances.261 To satisfy the second requirement, a series of
factors must be weighed and balanced, including the importance of the
common interests protected, the contribution of the trade restriction to
the success of the protection, and the impact of the measure on trade
flows.262 According to the Appellate Body in Korea—Beef, the court may
take into account the relative importance of the common interests or
values that the law or regulation to be enforced is intended to protect.
The more vital or important those common interests or values are, the
easier it would be to accept as „necessary‟ a measure designed as an
263
enforcement instrument.

In Asbestos, a case that illustrates the successful application of an
Article XX(b) exception, Canada challenged France‟s unilateral ban on
the import of all products containing asbestos.264 France defended on the
grounds that the ban was justified under the provisions of Article XX(b)
as a protection of human health.265 The Appellate Body upheld the
measure, based on a WTO Panel‟s finding “that the measure at issue is
„necessary to protect human . . . life or health‟, within the meaning of
Article XX(b).”266 The WTO Panel reasoned that France‟s measure
satisfied the chapeau of Article XX and was not discriminatory (and
therefore not arbitrary or unjustifiable) because it treated all asbestos
261
See, e.g., Report of the Panel, United States: Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt
Beverages, ¶ 5.52, 1992 WL 799397 (Mar. 16, 1992) (“It was incumbent upon the United States to
demonstrate that . . . the discriminatory common carrier requirement for imported beer and wine is
necessary to secure compliance with those laws. In the view of the Panel, the United States has not
demonstrated that the common carrier requirement is the least trade restrictive enforcement measure
available to the various states and that less restrictive measures, e.g. record-keeping requirements of
retailers and importers, are not sufficient for tax administration purposes. In this regard, the Panel
noted that not all fifty states of the United States maintain common carrier requirements. It thus
appeared to the Panel that some states have found alternative, and possibly less trade restrictive, and
GATT-consistent, ways of enforcing their tax laws. The Panel accordingly found that the United
States has not met its burden of proof in respect of its claimed Article XX(d) justification for the
common carrier requirement of the various states.”).
262
Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 150.
263
While Korea—Beef is primarily addressing GATT Article XX(d) in this paragraph, the
language and structure of XX(b) and (d) are closely enough related to enable us to draw precedential
conclusions from the language in Korea—Beef. Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting
Import of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 162, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11,
2000), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds161_e.htm.
264
Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 1-3, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), available at
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds135_e.htm.
265
Id.
266
Id. at ¶ 192(f).
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identically by banning it.267 The Appellate Body agreed, stating that “it is
undisputed that WTO Members have the right to determine the level of
protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given
situation.”268 In so ruling, the Appellate Body in Asbestos held that there
was no “reasonably available” alternative measure that would have been
less trade-restrictive.269 The Appellate Body said that in order to be
“reasonably available,” the measure had to achieve the same end and be
less restrictive of trade than a prohibition.270
The opposite conclusion was reached by a GATT Panel in
Thailand—Cigarettes, where it was found that Thailand could not ban
the import of foreign cigarettes for health reasons while allowing
domestic manufacturers to sell cigarettes uninhibited.271 Indeed, in that
case, the presence of contradictory domestic and foreign policies was
taken as evidence of a disguised restriction on international trade.272 The
key for an Article XX(b) analysis is whether the measure in question is
actually necessary and whether there is another, less restrictive, trade
measure that could reasonably be used instead.273 In Asbestos, there was
no measure other than a complete ban that would have allowed France to
achieve its desired level of health protection.274
Moreover, it appears that in the Appellate Body‟s opinion the more
important the value a particular measure is trying to protect, the more
leeway the measure has under Article XX(b).275 Specifically, in Asbestos
the Appellate Body said that “the objective pursued by the measure is the
preservation of human life and health through the elimination, or
reduction, of the well-known, and life-threatening, health risks posed by
asbestos fibres. The value pursued is both vital and important in the

267

Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContaining Products, ¶ 8.228, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000), available at www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds135_e.htm.
268
Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 168, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), available at
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds135_e.htm.
269
Id. at ¶ 169.
270
Id. at ¶ 172.
271
Report of the Panel, Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on
Cigarettes, DS10/R - 37S/200 (Nov. 7, 1990), available at www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/90cigart.pdf.
272
Id. at ¶ 81; see also Ghei, supra note 49, at 136.
273
Id. at 147 (quoting Asbestos Appellate Body Report, at 172, 174).
274
Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 168, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), available at
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds135_e.htm; see also Ghei, supra note 49, at 147.
275
Hawkins, supra note 33, at 436.
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highest degree.”276 The implication is that the more important the values
protected, the less leeway an alternative measure would have in a
determination of that measure‟s suitability.
More recently, the Appellate Body returned a decision in United
States—Gambling that contributes to a discussion about what is
considered more trade-restrictive than necessary.277 Though United
States—Gambling concerned the Global Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS), rather than GATT, the Appellate Body held that GATS Article
XIV exceptions should be interpreted with GATT Article XX exceptions
in mind, since the two Articles serve identical purposes within the larger
frameworks of GATS and GATT.278 The Appellate Body held that
necessity was an objective standard to be independently assessed by a
WTO decisional body, to which the characterization of a measure‟s
objectives and the effectiveness of the regulatory approach as evidenced
by the texts of statutes, legislative histories, and governmental
pronouncements, are relevant.279 A weighing and balancing system was
worked out based on (1) “an assessment of the „relative importance‟ of
the interests or values furthered by the challenged measure,” (2) “the
contribution of the measure to the realization of the ends pursued by it,”
and (3) “the restrictive impact of the measure on international
commerce.”280 Challenged measures should be compared to possible
alternatives in light of “the importance of the interests at issue,” upon
which evaluation the WTO decisional body will decide “whether
another, WTO-consistent measure is „reasonably available.‟”281
In Asbestos, the Appellate Body addressed the issue of scientific
certainty under GATT Article XX by granting states a great deal of
leeway.282 The Appellate Body said that it would support the discretion
276
Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 172, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), available at
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds135_e.htm.
277
Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005), available at
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm.
278
Id. at ¶ 291 (“Article XIV of the GATS sets out the general exceptions from obligations
under that Agreement in the same manner as does Article XX of the GATT 1994. Both of these
provisions affirm the right of Members to pursue objectives identified in the paragraphs of these
provisions even if, in doing so, Members act inconsistently with obligations set out in other
provisions of the respective agreements”); see also McInerney, supra note 144, at 178.
279
United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services, ¶ 304.
280
Id. at ¶ 306.
281
Id. at ¶ 307.
282
Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 177, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), available at
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of WTO Panels in weighing available evidence to determine the facts of
cases.283 Additionally, the Appellate Body held that “a Member may also
rely, in good faith, on scientific sources which, at that time, may
represent a divergent, but qualified and respected, opinion.”284 In other
words, WTO members do not have to follow majority scientific opinions
when setting health policies285—an important point in the context of
climate-change discussions because of the range of timeframe
assessments and the uncertainty surrounding exact damage impacts. 286
Though not reached in the context of other GATT Article XX
exceptions, it seems likely that states will have the benefit of similarly
wide discretion on issues of scientific certainty if the question arises in
future cases.287
ii.

GATT Article XX(g)

Under Article XX(g), the key considerations are (1) whether the
measure in question addresses the conservation of an exhaustible natural
resource, and (2) whether the measure has been made in conjunction with
domestic restrictions. There are two sub-parts to an analysis of whether
the measure addresses conservation: (a) the precise definition of a
measure, and (b) the strength of the relationship between the measure
and the legitimate conservation policy that the measure is aimed at.288 In
Reformulated Gasoline, the Appellate Body defined the measure in
question as that portion of the United States Clean Air Act found to be in
conflict with WTO law.289 In Shrimp—Turtle, the Appellate Body
handed down a similar ruling limiting the dispute to Section 609 of the
United States Endangered Species Act.290 Thus, the precise measure in
question under Article XX jurisprudence will be any provision found to
violate one or more of the substantive provisions of GATT.291
Having established the measure in question, WTO jurisprudence
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds135_e.htm.
283
Id.
284
Id. at ¶ 178.
285
See id.; see also Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at150-51.
286
Green, supra note 30, at 147.
287
See Green & Epps, supra note 135, at 296.
288
See Ozbirn, supra note 139, at 389-93.
289
Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, 1, 1996 WL 227476 (Apr. 29, 1996).
290
Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, ¶ 137, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm.
291
Ozbirn, supra note 139, at 390.
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considers whether the measure is aimed at a legitimate conservation
purpose. In Canada—Herring and Salmon a GATT Panel found that
conservation cannot be merely incidental to the effects of the measure.292
This interpretation was cited favorably by the Reformulated Gasoline
Panel293 and is also supported by the Appellate Body‟s requirement of “a
close and genuine relationship of ends and means” in Shrimp—Turtle.294
Essentially, the measure needs to be directly connected to the
conservation policy.295
Next, the resource being protected by a measure must meet the
criteria laid down by the Appellate Body for an “exhaustible natural
resource.” International law generally defines natural resources
broadly—the 1972 Stockholm Declaration states that they consist of “air,
water, land, flora and fauna and especially representative samples of
natural ecosystems.”296 Natural resources have also been defined broadly
by the Appellate Body in Reformulated Gasoline and in Shrimp—Turtle,
as well as in other GATT and WTO Panel and Appellate Body decisions.
For instance, such resources are not limited to the territory of the country
that has imposed restrictions.297 Furthermore, in Reformulated Gasoline
the Panel‟s finding that clean air was an exhaustible natural resource was
never appealed to the Appellate Body, which nonetheless stated that it
was willing to accept the Panel‟s ruling.298
The Panel‟s interpretation in Reformulated Gasoline was backed by
the Shrimp—Turtle Appellate Body‟s broad interpretation of
“exhaustible natural resource” so as to include sea turtles because they
292
The Panel concluded that Article XX(g) contains a requirement that a measure be
primarily aimed at conservation in order to be related to conservation—meaning that a measure
primarily aimed at protecting Canadian fish processing infrastructure and jobs did not qualify for an
Article XX(g) exception. Report of the Panel, Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed
Herring and Salmon, ¶ 4.7, L/6268 - 35S/98 (Mar. 22, 1988), available at
www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/canadaherring.pdf; see also Ozbirn, supra note 139, at
376; Ghei, supra note 49, at 135-36.
293
Panel Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, ¶
6.39, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
cases_e/ds2_e.htm.
294
United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 136,
WT/DS58/AB/R.
295
See Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 151.
296
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
StockholmPrinciple 2 (1972), available at www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?
DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1503.
297
See, e.g., Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R
(June 16, 1994), available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/tunadolphinII.pdf; see also
Gentile, supra note 31, at 206-07.
298
Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, 4, 1996 WL 227476 (Apr. 29, 1996).
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were both exhaustible (even though renewable) and a natural resource
(because so defined by other international agreements).299 In its ruling
supporting the actions of the United States in Shrimp—Turtle, the
Appellate Body held that this broad interpretation of Article XX(g) was
justified because the Article was not “limited to the conservation of
„mineral‟ or „non-living‟ natural resources,” and “that „exhaustible‟
natural resources and „renewable‟ natural resources are [not] mutually
exclusive” because so-called “renewable” resources are certainly capable
of “depletion, exhaustion and extinction, frequently because of human
activities.”300
The final analysis of Article XX(g) concerns whether the measure in
question was made in conjunction with some kind of domestic regulation
reaching the same subject.301 According to Jasper Ozbirn, “XX(g) does
not require the specific measure be the source of the domestic
restrictions, but merely that the country enacting the measure be subject
to similar [though not identical] regulations.”302 This is supported by the
Appellate Body‟s reasoning in Reformulated Gasoline finding that
identical restrictions would not violate GATT Article III:4; to treat
Article XX(g) as though it required identical regulations would make the
exceptions clause irrelevant—a result contrary to international treaty
interpretation practice.303 One way of looking at this is that the WTO
requires the regulating country to have “clean hands” and avoid behavior
inconsistent with its own stated goals.304
Some commentators believe that environmental and conservation
purposes tend to be looked upon unfavorably by GATT and WTO Panels
under Article XX exceptions.305 On the other hand, some see the WTO‟s
role as one of facilitation, ensuring that measures that purport to be
aimed at environmental goals are not disguised protectionist measures
aimed at restricting trade and circumventing the WTO‟s larger goal of
economic prosperity through sustainable development.306 Nita Ghei, for
299

See Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 151.
Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, ¶ 128, WT/DS58/AB/R, (Oct. 12, 1998), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm. For more on Shrimp—Turtle, please see Appendix C.
301
See Gentile, supra note 31, at 12 (“the key distinction is whether a border measure is
backed up by some internal regulation”).
302
Ozbirn, supra note 139, at 403.
303
Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, 13-14, 1996 WL 227476 (Apr. 29, 1996); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, Art. 31 (May, 23 1969).
304
See Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8 at 151.
305
See, e.g., Ozbirn, supra note 139, at 373-74.
306
See, e.g., Halvorssen, supra note 88, at 376-77.
300
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example, claims that the two-step Article XX analysis “has been quite
effective in distinguishing between legitimate environmental standards
and environmental standards that primarily function as non-tariff trade
barriers.”307
iii. The Chapeau of GATT Article XX
The chapeau of GATT Article XX functions to prevent abuse of the
exceptions it contains, based primarily on the principle of good faith.308
In Shrimp—Turtle, the Appellate Body explained that the application of
this principle “prohibits the abusive exercise of a state‟s rights” and
dictates that the assertion of such rights must be exercised reasonably. 309
This means that competing rights should not cancel each other out, but
rather that the role of the court is to establish a “line of equilibrium”
between competing interests such that the integrity of the balance of
rights and obligations established by signatories to the WTO agreements
is preserved. This line, the Appellate Body has held, can move depending
on the specific measure at issue and the public policy goals the measure
furthers.310 More and more, the focus of chapeau analysis has centered on
whether discrimination resulting from a challenged measure is
reasonably related to the goals of the measure.311
Article XX is designed to allow justifiable violations of the other
provisions of GATT while attempting to protect the integrity of GATT‟s
underlying economic philosophy by limiting the abuse of exceptions for
protectionist purposes. The two primary requirements of the chapeau are
that a measure not be arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminatory, and that
it not be a disguised restriction on international trade. The second of
these requirements has been interpreted more simply than the first: in
Asbestos, a WTO Panel found that in order for there to be disguise there
had to be intent to disguise on the part of the country enacting the
measure in question.312 Therefore, this requirement is seldom invoked
307

Ghei, supra note 49, at 119.
See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres,
¶ 224, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/cases_e/ds332_e.htm.
309
Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, ¶ 158, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm.
310
Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 224, WT/DS332/AB/R.
311
McInerney, supra note 144, at 198.
312
Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContaining Products, ¶ 8.236, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000), available at www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds135_e.htm.
308
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because it is so difficult to prove intent, and the enacting country must be
found to have intentionally concealed the enactment of the measure.313 In
many circumstances, simple publication of the measure could be enough
to satisfy this element of the chapeau.
The first requirement, that a measure not be arbitrarily or
unjustifiably discriminatory, is more complicated. Two parts seemed to
emerge from Shrimp—Turtle: (1) that measures be applied flexibly so
that comparable levels of effectiveness or protection, as opposed to
identical regulations, are allowed by importing states;314 and (2) that
there has been a prior good-faith effort to reach a multilateral or bilateral
solution.315 Shrimp—Turtle defined trade sanctions dependent on foreign
environmental regulation as acceptable under WTO law so long as the
measure was focused on the function and effectiveness of the protections
implemented rather than the form.316 In Shrimp—Turtle, regulations in
the United States requiring equal effectiveness from foreign
environmental regulation were legal under GATT, while regulations
requiring identical legislation were not.317 Nita Ghei concludes that
the greater the use of negotiation, and the greater the flexibility of the
unilateral measure in achieving its desired end, the more likely the
measure will pass WTO scrutiny. These conditions also diminish the
probability that the measure is the result of rent seeking. The
restrictions imposed by the WTO analysis increases the probability a
unilateral measure is truly welfare-enhancing; that the measure truly
protects the environment from damage, and not special interest groups
318
from foreign competition.

Similarly, at least one commentator has stated that good-faith
negotiations toward multilateral environmental agreements would be
enough to satisfy the chapeau.319
313

See Ozbirn, supra note 139, at 410.
Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, ¶ 166, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm; see also Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 14, 1996 WL 227476 (Apr. 29, 1996).
315
Id.
316
Ghei, supra note 49, at 148; Gavin Goh asserts that member states cannot discriminate
between exporting countries merely on the basis of whether they have ratified the Kyoto Protocol—
this supports the emphasis on function over form explained by Ghei. Goh, supra note 15, at 418.
317
United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/
ds58_e.htm.
318
Ghei, supra note 49, at 150.
319
See Green, supra note 30, at 179.
314
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In Shrimp—Turtle, the United States had regional agreements in
place with some trading partners that allowed for specific local
alternatives to the regulations spelled out in the United States
Endangered Species Act.320 This caused problems with GATT because
some nations were being treated more favorably, implying arbitrary and
unjustifiable discrimination. As demonstrated in Reformulated Gasoline,
the WTO appears to favor multilateral over unilateral solutions to
transboundary environmental problems.321 Multilateral agreements
appeared to play an influential role in the Appellate Body‟s decision in
Shrimp—Turtle Recourse Action. Specifically, the Appellate Body
pointed to the preference for, rather than the necessity of, multilateral
agreements to address transboundary environmental problems under
Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.322
The Appellate Body concluded in Shrimp—Turtle Recourse Action that
the prior good-faith effort at negotiation was sufficient to convince it that
there had been no arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against
countries without such agreements.323 Thus, the chapeau was satisfied.
The most recent decision by the Appellate Body relating to the
chapeau of Article XX (and the specific exception in Article XX(b))
came in the case of Brazil—Retreaded Tyres, a challenge by the
European Commission of a Brazilian measure restricting imports of used,
320

United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/
ds58_e.htm.
321
Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, 1996 WL 227476 (Apr. 29, 1996); Gentile, supra note 31, at 208-09.
322
Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 124, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 21,
2001), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm (“a multilateral
approach is strongly preferred. Yet it is one thing to prefer a multilateral approach in the application
of a measure that is provisionally justified . . . it is another to require the conclusion of a multilateral
agreement as a condition of avoiding „arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination‟ under the chapeau of
Article XX. We see, in this case, no such requirement.”); Dominic Gentile considers the inclusion of
multilateral environmental agreements like the Rio Declaration in recent decisions of the Appellate
Body to be a significant break from the WTO‟s history of avoiding the use of persuasive sources
from outside of the WTO agreements: “This reliance on and reference to multilateral environmental
agreements . . . in the context of a WTO dispute is especially noteworthy, and portends a new
approach to the resolution of these types of disputes.” Gentile, supra note 31, at 223.
323
Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 121-122, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 21,
2001), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm. It is important to
note here that the Appellate Body did not rule that unilateral environmental measures are per se
inconsistent with the chapeau of Article XX. See Ghei, supra note 49, at 144. This potentially opens
the door to upholding other unilateral environmental measures in WTO dispute proceeding, so long
as market access is conditioned on effectiveness rather than adoption of identical environmental
protections. Id.
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retreaded tires.324 The Appellate Body found that the chapeau had been
violated because the Brazilian measure allowed importers to use
unlimited court injunctions to circumvent the import ban, which qualified
as “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.”325 Citing United States—
Gasoline and Shrimp—Turtle, the Appellate Body held that it was
important to examine the cause of the discrimination and the rationale
put forward to explain its existence.326 The chapeau was also violated by
an exception to the import ban that allowed imports from other South
American countries under a separate treaty regime, leading to the
conclusion that the Brazilian measure was both arbitrary and
unjustifiable discrimination327 and a disguised restriction on international
trade.328 Specifically, the Appellate Body had “difficulty understanding
how discrimination might be viewed as complying with the chapeau of
Article XX when the alleged rationale for discriminating does not relate
to the pursuit of or would go against the objective that was provisionally
found to justify a measure under a paragraph of Article XX.”329
E.

QUALIFYING A GREENHOUSE-GAS-BASED BTA UNDER AN
ARTICLE XX EXCEPTION

No case has yet come before a GATT or WTO panel that explicitly
involved applying an Article XX exception to a measure involving
BTAs. Therefore, it is necessary to extrapolate from available WTO and
GATT precedent to craft an analysis supporting the use of BTAs that is
consistent with past decisions. Shrimp—Turtle and Asbestos show that
unilateral trade measures like BTAs can qualify for Article XX
exceptions.330 Both cases illustrate the successful application of Article
XX exceptions, Shrimp—Turtle under Article XX(g) and Asbestos under
Article XX(b).

324
Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 1,
WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
cases_e/ds332_e.htm.
325
Id. at ¶ 246.
326
Id. at ¶ 226.
327
Id. at ¶ 233.
328
Id. at ¶ 239.
329
Id. at ¶ 227.
330
In Shrimp—Turtle, the Appellate Body did not rule that unilateral environmental measures
are per se inconsistent with the chapeau of Article XX. This potentially opens the door to upholding
other unilateral environmental measures in WTO dispute proceeding, so long as market access is
conditioned on effectiveness rather than adoption of identical environmental protections. Ghei, supra
note 49, at 144,147.
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i.

Greenhouse-Gas-Based BTAs and Article XX(b) Exceptions

Under Article XX(b), a GHG-based BTA would have to be found to
protect life or health and be the least trade-restrictive option available.
Because global climate change is a transboundary problem that plainly
threatens human, animal, and plant life and health, an import BTA
should have no problem satisfying this first step. This is particularly true
considering that under the Appellate Body‟s ruling in Asbestos,
individual governments can determine at what level they wish to protect
the health of their citizens.331 Moreover, international recognition of
anthropogenic climate change as a scientifically based threat has long
been accorded the level of acceptance necessary for trade measures that
address it to succeed under an Article XX(b) exception.332
BTAs on exports are more difficult to justify than BTAs on imports
under this rationale because of the argument that the primary rationale
for BTA export measures is to address competitive disadvantages faced
by domestic industry rather than to directly prevent climate change.
Relieving domestic producers of the cost of GHG-based regulations is a
bit of a backwards approach to encouraging them to reduce GHG
emissions. A rationale based on the prevention of carbon leakage—
penalizing profits from international trade could have the effect of
limiting carbon leakage if such profits sufficiently outweigh the cost of
moving production facilities to unregulated countries—might be
convincing enough to justify a BTA on exports, especially if it could be
shown that there was some attempt at a balance between keeping
domestic industry from leaving and regulating GHG emission, but such a
conclusion is far from certain.
A WTO decisional body could move in one of two directions on this
issue—either treating import and export BTAs as part of a single
measure for the purposes of their Article XX(b) analysis, or treating them
separately. Thus, analysis of what constitutes a measure for the purposes
of Article XX—an issue addressed in Reformulated Gasoline—is
necessary.
In Reformulated Gasoline, the Appellate Body stated that for an
Article XX analysis a “measure” is simply that part of a rule or
regulation that is found to be in conflict with Article III:4.333 This leaves
331

Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 168, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), available at
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds135_e.htm.
332
See Goh, supra note 15, at 414.
333
Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, 8, 1996 WL 227476 (Apr. 29, 1996).
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some limited discretion while establishing a narrow reading of what parts
of a rule the WTO has authority to challenge. If export BTAs for GHGs
fail to qualify for an exception standing alone, they could be included as
part of the same measure as import BTAs. This is a result championed by
Ismer and Neuhoff: under their symmetric treatment rationale, export
BTAs could qualify for an exception on the weight of the arguments in
favor of import BTAs.334
This debate may well encompass a distinction without a
difference—as stated earlier, export BTAs are historically easier to
justify under WTO jurisprudence than import BTAs anyway, and a WTO
decisional body might simply not find a violation of the substantive
portions of GATT where export BTAs are concerned. If a violation is
found, a decisional body may find that export BTAs qualify for an
Article XX(g) exception. Either of these options would render the above
debate a purely academic exercise.
ii.

Greenhouse-Gas-Based BTAs and Article XX(g) Exceptions

In order to qualify under XX(g), the purpose of a GHG-based BTA
must be directly connected to a legitimate conservation policy for
exhaustible natural resources and made in conjunction with domestic
restrictions. This second requirement should be met because the amount
of tax applied by a BTA must be calculated based on the costs of
domestic regulation. As stated earlier, in order to be allowed as a BTA
under GATT, border adjustments for imported goods must be tied to
domestic tax levels such that imports do not suffer unjust discrimination.
For the first requirement, the WTO would have to determine that the
GHG-based BTA was aimed at preventing climate change rather than at
protecting domestic industry. A BTA for the costs of GHG regulation
would raise the cost of energy-intensive products and consequentially
encourage increases in energy efficiency and discourage carbon
leakage—all of which should qualify as legitimate conservation
purposes.335 Based on the Appellate Body‟s ruling in Shrimp—Turtle,
measures aimed at pressuring other governments to change their
domestic policies can be legitimate (thus limiting, if not outright
overruling, the GATT Panel‟s decision in Tuna—Dolphin II336).337 It is
334

Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 150.
Veel, supra note 32, at 777.
336
The Panel in Tuna—Dolphin II concluded that the embargo was not related to conservation
because it was based on pressuring foreign governments into satisfying the conservation goals of the
United States—a murky line of reasoning based perhaps on a concept of causality not explicitly
present in Article XX(g) itself. See Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of
335
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even possible that stating in a BTA measure‟s preamble that it was
primarily aimed at preventing or redressing climate change would be
enough, absent demonstrated mendacity, to convince a WTO decisional
body that the measure was aimed at a legitimate conservation purpose.
This rationale, combined with those concerning carbon leakage
described above, might be enough to obtain a XX(g) exception for a
GHG-based export BTA as well. However, many questions remain
concerning export BTAs and GHGs as product inputs, so whether they
would qualify for any Article XX exception is uncertain. In the end, the
question of whether the rebate of costs associated with GHG regulation
is primarily aimed at conservation or protectionist purposes might well
be decided against such a measure because the goal of protecting
domestic industry is so central to the BTA concept. On the other hand,
strong domestic GHG regulations could imply that the primary goal of
BTAs is to protect GHG friendly industry rather than domestic industry.
As stated above, however, an export BTA might not require an Article
XX exception at all.
An exhaustible-natural-resources analysis would have to analyze
GHG emissions as impacting exhaustible natural resources through
climate change. Perhaps the closest available analogy to climate change
is clean air, which was addressed in Reformulated Gasoline by a WTO
Panel (though the Appellate Body did not reach the issue in its
analysis).338 In that case, Venezuela argued that clean air could not be an
exhaustible natural resource because it was both renewable and regularly
changed in quality.339 In response, the Panel found that it made sense to
interpret the term exhaustible natural resource “very broadly.”340
The exhaustible-natural-resource requirement will not be an
obstacle to a XX(g) exception for a GHG-based BTA.341 Indeed, there
has been no successful challenge to the use of an Article XX(g)

Tuna, ¶ 5.24, DS29/R (June 16, 1994), available at www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/
tunadolphinII.pdf.
337
It is important to note that the hypothesis that unilateral measures can be used to pressure
foreign governments into policy changes has yet to be tested in the climate-change arena, with its
unique problems of causation as a result of the cumulative impact of greenhouse gases.
338
See, e.g., Veel, supra note 32, at 776.
339
Ozbirn, supra note 139, at 386.
340
Id. at 386-87.
341
Id. at 388 (“It seems clear, based on the Appellate Body‟s broad construction in United
States—Gasoline and its analysis in Shrimp-Turtle, that the element of „exhaustible natural
resources‟ will not be the biggest hurdle for a country to successfully argue that a measure is
justified under XX(g).”); see also Veel, supra note 32, at 776 (“[g]iven that anthropogenic climate
change is perhaps the predominant contemporary environmental concern, it seems likely [that this]
criterion would be satisfied”).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001

61

Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 3
03_B. EICHENBERG PRINTER VERSION

344

5/22/2010 11:27 AM

GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J.

[Vol. 3

exception on the grounds that the thing protected was not an exhaustible
natural resource.342 According to Ozbirn, “[t]his creates a general rule
that anything that can be depleted is exhaustible, and what is a „natural
resource‟ must be interpreted as understood internationally at the time of
the dispute.”343 Veel agrees, saying that “it seems likely that an
atmosphere without excessive amounts of CO2 can be characterized as an
exhaustible natural resource.”344 Therefore, global carbon and other GHG
concentrations could qualify as exhaustible natural resources under the
meaning of Article XX(g)345—as could coastlines (lost to sea-level rise),
fresh water, predictable rainfall and climate patterns, ice and glaciers,
biodiversity and ecosystems, etc.346 This conclusion is further supported
by the Appellate Body‟s interpretation of “natural resource” under
Article XX(g) as dynamic—incorporating international norms from
multilateral environmental agreements like the Kyoto Protocol.347
Some commentators claim that WTO member states will try to
justify trade discrimination in the context of climate change through
Article XX(g), based on an argument that the process and production
measures used as a basis for discrimination are harmful to an exhaustible
natural resource, namely the world climate system.348 This is the danger
various decisions of the Appellate Body have addressed under an
analysis of the chapeau of Article XX, especially Brazil—Retreaded
Tyres and Shrimp—Turtle, discussed in the next section.
iii. Greenhouse-Gas-Based BTAs and the Chapeau of Article XX
As previously stated, the two primary requirements of the chapeau
are that a measure not be arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminatory, and
that it not be a disguised restriction on international trade. The Appellate

342

See Ozbirn, supra note 139, at 388-89.
Id. at 388. Ozbirn bases this conclusion on the statement of the Appellate Body that its task
in deciding Shrimp—Turtle was to interpret the language of the chapeau, seeking additional
interpretative guidance, as appropriate, from the general “context of international law.” Id. Appellate
Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 158,
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/
ds58_e.htm.
344
Veel, supra note 32, at 776.
345
See Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 151.
346
For instance, Slayde Hawkins refers to “our climate resource” as an exhaustible natural
resource. Hawkins, supra note 33, at 446.
347
Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, ¶ 130-1, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm; see also Green, supra note 30, at 183.
348
See, e.g., Halvorssen, supra note 88, at 376.
343
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Body made it clear in Shrimp—Turtle that building flexibility into
measures based on foreign regulatory efforts is the key to WTO
compliance. Therefore, the design of a BTA for GHGs must focus border
adjustment triggering conditions on the effectiveness of foreign GHG
regulation rather than demanding that other countries institute identical
systems of regulation.
BTAs for greenhouse gases would both have an impact on, and be
impacted by, any number of regional trade agreements, not to mention
individual negotiations over tariff rates and greenhouse-gas abatement
measures. This raises a potential pitfall faced by BTA measures that treat
different exporting countries differently, as witnessed by the conclusions
of the Appellate Body in Brazil—Retreaded Tyres. But so long as these
differences are not arbitrary or unjustifiable—in other words, so long as
there is a comprehensive and rational system in place for assessing tax
adjustments at the border—there is no reason why a GHG-based BTA
must run afoul of this provision of the chapeau.
Care would have to be taken in circumstances similar to those in
Shrimp—Turtle—where the regulating country has negotiated alternative
agreements with some governments but not with others—to allow equal
access to negotiated alternatives.349 But as the Appellate Body stated in
Shrimp—Turtle, only a good-faith effort at negotiation is necessary, not a
resulting agreement.350 According to Ismer and Neuhoff, the intensive
negotiating history of climate summits and discussions would be more
than enough to satisfy this requirement.351 However, Goh cautions that
mere “participation in multilateral negotiations does not by itself provide
an importing Member carte blanche to impose trade restrictive measures
such as energy tax adjustments,” asserting that importers have an
obligation under Article XX to pursue negotiations.352
III. PLANNED BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS RELATED TO GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSIONS
To date, there are no Border Tax Adjustments (BTAs) specifically
targeted at greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, nor are there any for

349
United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 172-3,
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/
ds58_e.htm.
350
Id.
351
See Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 152. However, they note that this view is not
universally held. Id. (citing Gavin Goh, The World Trade Organization, Kyoto and Energy Tax
Adjustments at the Border, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 395 (2004)).
352
Goh, supra note 15, at 417-18.
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energy inputs used in the production process.353 However, there are
several economic and regional sectors where BTAs have been
proposed.354 For instance, countries that apply domestic taxes to fossil
fuels as a fiscal measure often apply a BTA to imports of like fuels.355
Recently proposed climate legislation in the United States includes a
“competitiveness provision” or “international reserve allowances”
designed along the lines of a BTA.356 Additionally, a report prepared for
the Japanese Environment Agency suggests that BTAs might be
advisable where products are exchanged with countries that do not take
economic measures to protect the environment similar to those taken by
Japan.357 Finally, there are some proposals, published in academic
circles, for economically feasible BTAs for greenhouse gases.358 Because
the evidence of the threat posed by climate change continues to grow, it
seems likely that GHG-based BTAs will start cropping up in GHGregulating states sometime in the near future.359
Some point out that companies in the United States enjoy a
significant competitive advantage due to the lack of GHG regulation, and
suggest that to the extent this disadvantages European Union (EU)
companies, the EU should impose border tax adjustments equal to GHG
costs faced by domestic producers to level the playing field.360 In fact,
there is increasing pressure from industrial producers in the EU to
impose carbon tariffs in response to the failure of the United States to
comply with Kyoto targets.361 According to the World Bank, “the
potential impact of such punitive measures by the EU could result in a
loss of about 7 percent in U.S. exports to the EU,” with energy intensive
industries suffering as much as a 30-percent loss.362 These industries
include heavy industrial sectors like the cement industry, aluminum
manufacturers, and steel producers. Though there have been no

353

THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 24.
Goh, supra note 15, at 399.
355
THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 24.
356
See, e.g., Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, 110th Cong. (as
placed on the calendar of the Senate on May 21, 2008).
357
Goh, supra note 15, at 400.
358
See, e.g.,Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8.
359
See Green & Epps, supra note 135, at 291; Veel, supra note 32, at, 776-777.
360
See, e.g., Halvorssen, supra note 88, at 378; see also Goh, supra note 15, at 400; Green &
Epps, supra note 135, at 287.
361
THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 12.
362
Id. Though its use of the word “punitive” is clearly pejorative, it reflects commonly held
free-trade principles that hold that limitations on trade are bad. The World Bank could have stated
that such tariffs were fair or self-protective, had they approached the issue from a different point of
view.
354
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documented results that support the perception that high energy taxes
have a negative impact on economic competitiveness, serious efforts to
reduce GHG emissions would almost certainly result in much higher
energy costs than those imposed by normal energy taxes because such a
large percentage of GHG emissions come from energy generation.363
Higher costs are exactly what domestic industries are afraid of, and why
BTAs would serve a valuable function facilitating GHG regulation.
A.

SOME PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS FOR
GREENHOUSE GASES

There are a broad range of environmental taxes that could be used to
restrict GHG emissions, including carbon taxes, energy taxes, and fuel
taxes, and taxes on air emissions, chemical processes, feedstock
chemicals, waste disposal, and water pollution. The wide range of these
examples highlights the difficulties faced by regulators attempting to find
a comprehensive body of international legal precedent to guide the
design of BTAs. Where the item taxed is physically incorporated into a
final product, such as feedstock chemicals into a final chemical product,
the weight of WTO law stands behind allowing BTAs.364 However, the
law surrounding input or process taxes, such as air pollution, energy
efficiency, waste disposal, and sustainable harvesting practices, is
significantly more uncertain.365
It could be very difficult administratively to quantify the exact level
of taxes appropriate for BTAs addressed to the costs of domestic GHG
regulation.366 So many different activities produce GHGs, and so many
of those activities are taxed in one form or another that the complex
practicalities of formulating fair BTAs in this context cause some to
dismiss the prospect of a functional GHG-based BTA all together. These
problems include such issues as identifying the carbon content of traded
goods—especially where exporting countries have little incentive to
cooperate or resent the imperialist overtones of border tax regimes—or
where tracing the content of a particular GHG tax, such as a tax on the
methane produced by cows being traced in proportion in the cow‟s meat,
hide, hooves, etc.367 Additional problems may arise because of the large
363

Goh, supra note 15, at 400.
See, e.g., Report of the Panel, United States—Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported
Substances, L/6175 - 34S/136 (June 5, 1987), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
gt47ds_e.htm.
365
See Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 59.
366
Id. at 32.
367
See, e.g., Goh, supra note 15, at 422; see also Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at
364
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range of energy production technologies in use and the difficulties faced
by administrators attempting to set average levels based on predominant
methods of production.368
If the calculation of GHG inputs for individual products is
problematic, so too is the calculation of how much of a particular tax on
product inputs is actually passed along to consumers. This is similar to
our earlier discussion of the economic rationales for the direct/indirect
tax distinction—such difficulties implicate an inherent risk of double
taxation and other forms of trade inefficiency. However, some claim that
by limiting tax adjustments only to inputs physically incorporated or
present in the final product, this kind of inefficiency can be avoided.369
There is some flexibility in WTO rules where such practicalities are
concerned. The Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments commented
that some taxes presented difficulties in “calculating exactly the amount
of compensation,” but that “it was administratively sensible and
sufficiently accurate to rebate by average rates for a given class of
goods.”370 Predominant methods of domestic production, for instance,
could be used to calculate the GHG content of imported products.371
This, at least, presents one avenue for the practical design of a GHGbased BTA.
Additionally, information about things like energy inputs and
efficiency should be readily available to product manufacturing firms. As
Demaret points out, “a company which does not know such information
is not in a position to ensure that it is using the most efficient and
productive combination of inputs.”372 Government requirements that
such information be provided to regulators might not be as difficult to
comply with as an initial glance at the problem implies, especially where
providing such information is financially in the best interest of
manufacturers. For imports, GHG certificates could be required to
accompany products. Alternatively, assumptions could be made
concerning predominant production methods, a strategy that survived
32; Zhang & Assunção, supra note 33, at 380-81.
368
See Goh, supra note 15, at 422, (citing Report of the Panel, United States—Taxes on
Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, L/6175 - 34S/136 (June 5, 1987), available at
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gt47ds_e.htm).
369
Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 32.
370
In particular, the Working Party pointed to cascade tax systems: “For adjustment, countries
operating cascade systems usually resorted to calculating average rates of rebate for categories of
products rather than calculating the actual tax levied on a particular product.” Report of the Working
Party, Border Tax Adjustments, ¶ 16, L/3464 (Dec. 2, 1970), available at www.worldtradelaw.net/
reports/gattpanels/bordertax.pdf.
371
Zhang & Assunção, supra note 33, at 380-81.
372
Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 33.
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GATT review in United States—Superfund.373
B.

A PROPOSAL FOR AN ECONOMICALLY FEASIBLE BORDER TAX
ADJUSTMENT

Ismer and Neuhoff have constructed a model BTA based on Best
Available Technology (BAT) in order to avoid discrimination against
foreign producers.374 They claim that a “BTA scheme with reference
technology levels set at BAT would . . . be admissible under WTOrules.”375 In order to arrive at this conclusion, Ismer and Neuhoff follow
the view that products should be considered “like” regardless of
production methods; they thus claim that the only way to successfully
qualify such a BTA would be to use the lowest GHG related charge
incurred by any domestic producer.376 This charge should be assessed
assuming that all components of a product have been manufactured using
BAT377 because it would be administratively prohibitive to determine a
BTA for every product according to the amount of GHG its production
actually emits.378
Estimates in this model would rely on calculation of the average
amount of GHG generated by the production of raw materials. Ismer and
Neuhoff concentrate on simplicity, suggesting that, at least in the
beginning, certain thresholds be established to exclude raw materials that
produce relatively low levels of GHG.379 The burden of reporting
quantities of basic materials consumed during production would lie with
producers.380 Electricity inputs would be addressed separately by
compensating only for changes in overall price because of the
interconnected regional nature of the world‟s energy grids.381 This model
would conservatively calculate the GHG content of a product for the
purpose of tax remissions, and the remission would be the same

373

Id.
Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 8, at 155.
375
Id. at 152.
376
Id. at 147.
377
Ismer and Neuhoff define BAT as “the most effective and advanced stage in the
development of activities and their methods of operations which indicate the practical suitability for
providing in principle the basis for emission limit values designed to prevent and, where that is not
practicable, generally to reduce emissions and the impact on the environment as a whole.” Id. This,
they argue, is the only really feasible way to calculate a BTA that would also be compatible with
GATT Articles I and III ¶ 2. Id. at 148.
378
Id. at 153.
379
Id.
380
Id.
381
Id. at 154.
374
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regardless of how the product was actually produced.382
A BAT system has to set an appropriate level for its taxes and
ensure that individual firms cannot define new BAT simply through the
construction of a new facility. One solution for this problem is to define
BAT through the market share a given technology holds and to ensure
that the BAT standard covers several related products.383 In fact, Ismer
and Neuhoff recommend entrusting BAT determinations to an
independent body informed by both domestic and foreign industry.384
Ismer and Neuhoff‟s model demonstrates that there are
administratively efficient and economically feasible methodologies for
instituting a BTA related to the costs of domestic GHG regulation. There
are potential difficulties with a BAT model, like the practicalities of
determining what the BAT actually is and the potential inherent in any
such process for perverse economic incentives, for instance. Also
troubling is the necessity for additional regulatory institutions that would
make economic policy decisions about taxes on imports. Nevertheless,
this remains a viable model and an answer to those who claim that the
complexities of a BTA that would reflect GHG emissions overwhelm the
potential usefulness of such a BTA.
C.

THE “COMPETITIVENESS PROVISION” IN PROPOSED CLIMATE
LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES

For many of the competitiveness, carbon leakage, and political
economy concerns expressed in the opening section of this Article, the
United States is considering what is referred to as a “competitiveness
provision” in currently proposed climate legislation.385 Essentially, this
provision would be a BTA based on the costs to producers of GHG
reductions. The proposed measures would apply only to goods
manufactured in countries that are major emitters of GHGs and that have
failed to implement sufficient emissions-reduction measures of their
own.386
America‟s Climate Security Act of 2007387 and the Low Carbon

382

Id. at 145.
Id. at 143.
384
Id. at 147.
385
See, e.g., Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (as
reported in the Senate on Oct. 18, 2007); Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong.
(as introduced in the Senate on July 11, 2007).
386
Ponnambalam, supra note 42, at 265-66.
387
Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (as reported in the
Senate on Oct. 18, 2007).
383
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Economy Act of 2007,388 though neither was passed into law, would
have conditioned access to markets in the United States on the purchase
of GHG emissions allowances, sometimes called “international reserve
allowances,” or would have provided cash or securities equivalent to the
purchase price of such allowances,389 except where the exporting country
had comparable GHG restrictions in place.390 One commentator, Slayde
Hawkins, believes that these provisions would have violated the
nondiscrimination clauses of GATT Article I and III, because they
differentiate between like products on the basis of GHGs produced
during the production process (in other words, on the basis of PPMs).
But Hawkins asserts that they would nevertheless qualify for exception
under Article XX(b) and (g).391 Hawkins claims that the chapeau of
Article XX is satisfied by the preference of the American climate
measures for negotiations and their acceptance of comparable action
from trading partners rather than identical GHG reduction measures.392
The Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008 demonstrates
four areas of particular interest to a discussion of the practical
foundations of a BTA related to domestic GHG regulation: (1) the
definition of which goods are required to purchase internal reserve
allowances—the equivalent of a BTA, (2) the criteria by which an
importing country‟s GHG regulations are evaluated to determine if that
country‟s goods will be required to purchase internal reserve allowances,
(3) how a calculation of the cost of internal reserve allowances is to be
arrived at, and (4) the methodology for calculating the number of internal
reserve allowances that must be purchased.393 These four mechanisms are
integral to the practical analysis of a GHG-based BTA‟s compliance with
WTO law.
Covered goods are defined as primary products that directly or
indirectly generate a substantial quantity of GHGs during manufacturing
and are “closely related” to goods affected by the requirements of the
388
Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong. (as introduced in the Senate on
July 11, 2007).
389
Veel, supra note 32, at 763. This provision for securities or cash equivalents was an
alteration added in 2008. Id.
390
Hawkins, supra note 33.
391
Id. at 441-42. Hawkins further points out that “if a covered sector in a country without
comparable GHG restrictions in place emits much more GHGs overall than the same sector in the
U.S., „like‟ products from the foreign country will be required to purchase many more GHG
emissions allowances than their U.S. counterparts . . . . [F]oreign products in that situation face more
onerous requirements under the program.” Id. at 443. This implies a violation of GATT Article III.
Id. at 443.
392
Id. at 448.
393
Veel, supra note 32, at 763-64.
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Climate Security Act.394 “Closely related” is probably equivalent to a
like-product analysis under GATT and ensures that like goods are treated
the same. One potential problem pointed out by Veel is that domestic
producers that emit less than 10,000 carbon dioxide equivalents a year
are exempt, while foreign producers are not party to this de minimis
threshold.395 However, this is a very low threshold and may not actually
have a practical impact on imports.396
Covered goods are exempt from the requirements of the legislation
if the exporting country is determined to have taken comparable actions
to limit GHG emissions, has been identified by the United Nations “as
among the least-developed of developing countries,” or whose share of
GHG emissions fall below a de minimis threshold not more than 0.5
percent of total global emissions.397 All of these criteria raise significant
problems with GATT Article I:1‟s Most Favored Nations clause398 and
would probably necessitate the use of an Article XX exemption. For the
exemption to be available, the definition of comparable action must
comply with the case law described earlier concerning arbitrary
discrimination and comparable action in the Shrimp—Turtle series of
cases. As Veel points out, the comparable-action requirement “imposes
very few requirements on the form that a state‟s actions must take in
reducing greenhouse gases in order to be considered [comparable].”399
This flexibility is of vital importance to compliance with GATT Article
XX exemptions, since balanced and rational decision making plus the
ability to negotiate are distinct components of the Appellate Body‟s case
law.
The price of international reserve allowances is established for each
year at the most recent allowance auction and cannot exceed the market
price of domestic allowances.400 This ensures that the BTA does not

394
Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, 110th Cong., § 6001(5) (as
placed on the calendar of the Senate on May 21, 2008).
395
Veel, supra note 32, at 765.
396
Id. at 765.
397
Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, 110th Cong., § 6006(b)(2)(AB),(c)(4)(B) (as placed on the calendar of the Senate on May 21, 2008).
398
See Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries, GATT Tokyo Round, Decision of 28 November 1979 (L/4903). However,
exempting countries identified as least developed might qualify under the terms of the Enabling
Clause, which allows developed countries to offer more favorable treatment to the developing
economies without according like treatment to other WTO members. Id.; see also Veel, supra note
32, at 785-86.
399
Id. at 767.
400
Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, 110th Cong., § 6006(a)(3)(AB) (as placed on the calendar of the Senate on May 21, 2008).
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exceed the tax assessed on domestic production and that it has been made
in conjunction with domestic legislation, both WTO requirements for
BTAs. Additionally, the proceeds from the sale of international reserve
allowances is earmarked for climate-change adaptation efforts in
“disadvantaged communities in other countries.”401 This stipulation acts
as an argument against claims of protectionist practices and militates for
an interpretation of the legislation as possessing a significant nexus with
conservation purposes.
The quantity of international reserve allowances required for each
type of good is to be established through a general formula based on the
GHG emissions produced by the manufacture of that good in the country
in question and adjusted to take into account free allocation of domestic
allowances, general GHG emissions from that particular industry sector,
and the level of economic development in the exporting country.402
Under this proposed legislation, the importation of all covered goods
must be accompanied by written declarations of either excluded status or
sufficient international reserve allowances to cover the goods.403 The
potentially dangerous aspect of this methodology is that the BTA is not
assessed based on an approximation of the actual GHG emissions that
result from the production of the covered good; rather, the BTA is
assessed based on the total GHG emissions for certain types of goods in
the exporting country. Thus, foreign producers are not treated identically
to domestic producers, whose GHG tax is assessed based on actual
emissions.404 However, as stated earlier, domestic and foreign taxes do
not have to be exactly the same, just roughly equivalent. In Reformulated
Gasoline, Venezuelan producers were able to show that the
methodologies for calculating domestic tax rates were more favorable
than the methodologies for calculating tax rates for foreign products—
importers assessed a GHG-based BTA would have to similarly prove that
they were disadvantaged when compared with domestic producers. The
question of whether the methodologies for calculating domestic and
foreign GHG allowance requirements are roughly equivalent is a
determination that will probably end up with the Appellate Body.

401

Id. at § 6006(a)(7).
Id. at § 6006(d)(1)(A)-(B).
403
Id. at § 6006(c)(1)-(2)(A)-(B).
404
Veel, supra note 32, at 769.
402
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POTENTIAL WEAKENING EFFECTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION FROM BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS

Subsidies can actually have a weakening effect on environmental
regulation. As Andrew Green points out in his 2006 article, “a subsidy
may lead to an „informational cascade,‟ overcoming information
constraints and potentially bounded rationality.”405 Applying this analysis
to BTAs, we can look at the possibility of a cascading effect as a result of
market distortions from tax adjustments. In other words, people who
might normally be inclined to purchase domestic products because of the
perception that such products are produced in a more environmentally
sustainable manner may no longer do so. Additionally, BTAs assume
that people will buy the cheapest product available—otherwise it would
not be so important to protect domestic industry from an influx of
environmentally suspect cheap products. This line of reasoning could
weaken a like-product analysis that was based on consumer
preferences—consumers who assume that the environmental slate has
been wiped clean by BTAs will be less likely to differentiate based on
environmental practices.
Some worry that GHG-based BTAs may reduce incentives for
exporting countries to regulate climate change themselves, or to
strengthen such regulations, because of the potential of such regulation to
disadvantage exports.406 However, a BTA regime that took into account
the GHG-regulation efforts of exporting countries—perhaps based on the
model provided by Shrimp—Turtle so as to ensure that it would survive
WTO review—would significantly reduce such worries. The Appellate
body in Shrimp—Turtle held that it was necessary to strike a balance
between the needs of other member states and the regulating state‟s need
to protect limited natural resources.407 If a GHG-based BTA wishes to
qualify for an Article XX exception it will probably need some sort of
balanced treatment along the lines of the regulatory effort at issue in
Shrimp—Turtle.
There is worry that environmental BTAs could have a distorting
effect on international trade, threatening the principles of the 1992 Rio
Declaration. The Rio Declaration, almost universally accepted as
containing many of the guiding principles of international environmental

405

Green, supra note 83, at 429.
See, e.g., Goh, supra note 15, at 405.
407
Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 149, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 21,
2001), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm.
406
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law, emphasizes the necessity of internalizing environmental costs and
avoiding distortional effects to international trade.408 Such worries might
be assuaged by the ability of the WTO to adapt to international norms
like those promulgated by the Rio Declaration. In Shrimp—Turtle, the
Appellate Body found that the term “natural resource” was dynamic and
could thus adapt over time to changing international norms.409 The
Appellate Body relied on international law to define the framework of
GATT, so Shrimp—Turtle could stand for the proposition that GATT
should be interpreted in light of prevailing norms of international law.410
The WTO Panel decision in EC—Biotech might limit the scope of
this holding from Shrimp—Turtle. Even though EC—Biotech was never
appealed to the Appellate Body, it was adopted by the Dispute
Settlement Body. While acknowledging that “the mere fact that one or
more disputing parties are not parties to a convention does not
necessarily mean that a convention cannot shed light on the meaning and
scope of a treaty term to be interpreted,”411 the Panel in EC—Biotech
distinguished Shrimp—Turtle on the grounds that the Convention on
Biological Diversity and the Biosafety Protocol were not relevant to the
interpretation of the WTO agreements in dispute.412 When the ordinary
meaning of the WTO Agreement is clear, the Panel found, WTO Panels
are not obligated to rely on other rules of international law.413 EC—
Biotech did affirm, though, that the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties applies to WTO interpretations.414 Again, the Appellate Body
has not reviewed the conclusions of EC—Biotech and is under no
obligation to adopt the legal conclusions of a WTO Panel, and this
particular finding is not particularly detailed or thoroughly explained.
Therefore, taking international norms and principles into account could
still be necessary to survive WTO review.

408
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 16 (June 14, 1992), available
at www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163&l=en.
409
Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, ¶ 130, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm.
410
Id. Indeed, the Appellate Body references the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, The Convention on Biological Diversity, Agenda 21, the Resolution on Assistance to
Developing Countries, and the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild
Animals. Id.; see also Goh, supra note 15, at 419.
411
Report of the Panel, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products, ¶ 7.94, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006),
available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds291_e.htm.
412
Id. at ¶ 7.95.
413
Id. at ¶ 7.93.
414
Id. at ¶ 7.92.
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IV. THE RESULT OF BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS: THE STICK
Getting trade policy and environmental policy to mesh in an
efficient way is tremendously important to the health of both the global
economy and the environment. One of the underlying dysfunctions of
environmental protection is that environmental regulation all over the
world has been co-opted by domestic industry lobbyists, and most
regulatory efforts are currently sculpted to favor domestic producers at a
high overall cost to the effectiveness of environmental measures as well
as to the international economic system. In 1994, Michael Leidy and
Bernard Hoekman noted a disturbing tendency to reject the most efficient
environmental regulatory regime in favor of less efficient options
involving governmentally administered sector-specific protection from
foreign competition.415 Such choices result in more market-failureinducing externalities and higher net societal costs for environmental
protection. Leidy and Hoekman blame this tendency on a confluence of
the interests of import-competing polluters,416 environmental groups,417
labor, and even foreign importers—all of whom are interested in the
heightened trade restrictions likely to accompany inefficient
environmental regulation.418 In fact, Leidy and Hoekman suspect that
there is an “endogeneity419 of trade barriers to environmental
regulations . . . [that] may influence interest-group preferences for
alternative environmental policies.”420 Nita Ghei also believes that “both
legitimate environmental concerns and illegitimate protectionist rentseeking can result in the use of environmental standards as trade

415

Leidy & Hoekman, supra note 27; see also Ghei, supra note 49, at 130-32.
Leidy and Hoekman point out that the “[i]ndustries facing the highest pollution-abatement
costs are among those most frequently seeking and receiving protection in industrialized countries.”
Id. at 243. Examples include the Australian chemical industry and the American cement industry,
among others. Id.
417
Id. at 251. A regulatory approach is superior from the environmentalist‟s perspective
because quantity-based approaches guarantee reductions in pollution, while tax-based approaches do
not. Id. at 251-52.
418
Id. at 242.
419
In an economic model, a parameter or variable are said to be endogenous when there is a
correlation between the parameter or variable and the error term. Endogeneity can arise as a result of
measurement error, autoregression with autocorrelated errors, simultaneity, omitted variables, and
sample selection errors. For example, in a simple supply and demand model, when predicting the
quantity demanded in equilibrium, the price is endogenous because producers change their price in
response to demand and consumers change their demand in response to price. In contrast, a change
in consumer tastes or preferences would be an exogenous change on the demand curve. In this case,
the price variable is said to have total endogeneity once the demand and supply curves are known.
420
Leidy and Hoekman, supra note 27, at 244.
416
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barriers.”421
Protectionist temptations are the danger that WTO jurisprudence
sets out to protect against. In Reformulated Gasoline, for example,
challenged trade measures had many of the features economists associate
with inefficient environmental regimes of the type preferred by domestic
industry as protectionist measures.422 Therefore, it is important to analyze
the policy implications of BTAs and the overall tendency for such
instruments to be co-opted by protectionist interests so that these pitfalls
can be avoided as much as possible.
The United States‟ successful experiences with the accomplishment
of conservation goals through its Superfund and ozone-depleting
chemical (ODC) taxes show the utility of BTAs for achieving
environmental policy goals.423 Duncan Brack claims that without the
ODC tax, industry in the United States would have been snuffed out by
international competition because of the high tax levels imposed
domestically without any certain reduction in ODC production.424
Furthermore, the Superfund and ODC experiences show that taxes on
embodied inputs are administratively feasible and lay out some
possibilities for addressing concerns about taxes on GHG-producing
product inputs.
BTAs can also play a role in circumventing systemic protectionist
biases and avoiding many of the pitfalls pointed out in the preceding
paragraphs. BTAs are a viable alternative to inefficient protectionist
regulation because they address concerns about unfair trade advantages
due to international competition from unregulated manufacturers without
creating conditions favorable to domestic monopolies and cartel-like
profits. While penalty taxes tend to be the most efficient instruments to
achieve pollution abatement, firms prefer quantity regulation (with
quotas assigned below minimum efficient scale425) because of the greater
potential for cartel-like profits.426 In order to ensure optimal economic
efficiency, great care must be taken when crafting BTA measures, to
avoid putting a greater regulatory burden on importers than is necessary
to merely level the playing field. In this way, the WTO can act to
421

Ghei, supra note 49, at 131.
The Appellate Body concluded that “the resulting discrimination must have been foreseen,
and was not merely inadvertent or unavoidable.” Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 20, 1996 WL 227476 (Apr. 29, 1996); see also Ghei,
supra note 49, at 140.
423
BRACK ET AL., supra note 18, at 79.
424
Id.
425
Leidy & Hoekman, supra note 27, at 247.
426
Id. at 244.
422
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incentivize fair and balanced BTA measures by finding arbitrary
discrimination where BTAs fail to meet this standard. So constructed,
BTAs could be a vital tool to defuse pressures brought to bear by
domestic industry and labor in support of quantity-based restrictions and
protectionist measures.427
Unilateral trade measures aimed at protecting the environment have
been acknowledged as acceptable under GATT by the Appellate body in
cases like Asbestos and Shrimp—Turtle. Within limits, unilateral
measures like BTAs can be used to prevent trans-boundary
environmental problems like climate change.428 After a thorough
exploration of these limits, as has been so far compiled, what remains is
to investigate the state of global climate governance and the role that
BTAs can play in the effective pursuit of worldwide GHG reductions.
A.

HARMONIZATION THROUGH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS AND BOTTOM-UP
CLIMATE REGIMES

Applying a climate-tax regime broadly across states would require
treaties to harmonize the application of prior-stage environmental
taxes.429 Demaret points out that harmonization of specific taxes has
posed tremendous difficulty in the European Union (EU), and that
because of such difficulties it is unclear if such harmonization has any
real potential in the international context.430 Bilateral treaty regimes may
offer more concrete chances of success, as demonstrated by the United
States in Shrimp—Turtle. Indeed, as negotiations on multilateral
environmental agreements intended to bind every country in the world
show increasing signs of stagnation, it is important to understand the
types of unilateral measures countries may turn to in an effort to avoid a
loss of momentum in the effort to address anthropogenic climate change.
Barbara Buchner and Carlo Carraro, for instance, prefer “a bottom-up,
country-driven approach to defining national commitments. Instead of a
top-town, international negotiation on national emission targets, each
country would determine its contribution to a cooperative effort to curb
GHGs and choose the partners with whom it intends to cooperate.”431
427

Id. at 251.
See Veel, supra note 32, at 771 (“[W]hile carbon tariffs may be permissible under current
WTO rules, this result is by no means obvious and would potentially require a justification of their
permissibility under Article XX(g) of the GATT.”); see also Gentile, supra note 31, at 208-09.
429
Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 23, at 33.
430
Id.
431
Barbara Buchner & Carlo Carraro, Regional and Sub-Global Climate Blocs: a Cost428
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Indeed, Carraro and Christian Egenhofer believe that the near future of
climate negotiations will result in several parallel agreements aimed at
controlling climate change, backed up by domestic measures and policies
implemented unilaterally or in conjunction with small groups of likeminded countries.432
Current trade and climate negotiations already result in the
formation of regional coalitions and blocs of countries with similar
interests, with coalitions forming between such blocs in order to secure
special considerations.433 Regional and sub-regional cooperation is
gaining importance in international law with the proliferation of freetrade areas and customs unions. Indeed, most multilateral agreements
begin as regional agreements of some kind.434 Buchner and Carraro use
the results from economic game-theory research to conclude that it is
unlikely that all relevant countries will sign the Kyoto Protocol, resulting
in the emergence of alternative climate blocs.435 They point to potential
cooperative agreements after 2012 resulting in, among other possibilities,
(1) European Union-Russia and China-Japan climate blocs, with the
United States perhaps pursuing climate policy under a NAFTA
framework; or (2) a two-bloc coalition involving the United States with
China and the European Union with Russia and Japan.436 At the
conclusion of their book of collected essays on the subject, Carraro and
Egenhofer conclude that sub-global climate agreements are likely to
emerge in the near future and to be effective at addressing atmospheric
GHG concentrations more quickly than a global regime would.437
Domestic measures supporting such a regime would be designed to
create powerful individual incentives for other countries in order to
reduce the impact of free-rider problems. Trade measures could include
Benefit Analysis of Bottom-Up Climate Regimes, in CLIMATE AND TRADE POLICY: BOTTOM-UP
APPROACHES TOWARD GLOBAL AGREEMENT 16, 17 (Carlo Carraro & Christian Egenhofer eds.,
2007).
432
Carlo Carraro & Christian Egenhofer, Bottom-Up Approaches to Climate Change Control:
Some Policy Conclusions, in CLIMATE AND TRADE POLICY: BOTTOM-UP APPROACHES TOWARD
GLOBAL AGREEMENT 116, 120 (Carlo Carraro & Christian Egenhofer eds., 2007).
433
Buchner and Carraro suggest, for instance, the division of countries into Annex I and nonAnnex I blocs, the special emissions redistribution provisions secured by the European Union, and
Australia‟s special provision on land use emissions as examples from the Kyoto Protocol. Buchner
& Carraro, supra note 431, at 17.
434
Id. at 17-18.
435
Id. at 18-19.
436
Id. at 21-28. This final scenario is the one that the authors deem most likely to occur
because “it causes small welfare losses for the US and China and small welfare gains for the [EU
with Russia and Japan], while leading to a considerably enhanced environmental effectiveness of
climate policy.” Id. at 28.
437
Carraro & Egenhofer, supra note 432, at 119.
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BTAs, tariffs, or outright sanctions used as tools or weapons against
countries that refuse to adopt GHG standards specified by regulating
countries.438 The overarching concept behind such measures could be to
create a bottom-up approach to defining national GHG reduction
commitments instead of investing time and resources only in the
completion of an omnibus multilateral environmental agreement.439
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) offer another route for
countries to pursue environmental trade agendas. Problems defining
environmental goods and services would be less of a problem under an
RTA, and supply-side capacities and technical assistance to developing
economies would be easier to build into such agreements.440 Often,
controversial problems can be resolved more quickly at a regional level
than at a global level, a lesson that climate negotiators would be wise to
learn from the history of trade negotiations.441
V.

CONCLUSION

As Tom Athanasiou writes, “[t]here is no choice between climate
protection and human development. We shall have both, or we shall have
neither.”442 And yet it is widely acknowledged that dramatic reductions
in the emissions of developing economies are an absolute necessity for
any long-term solution to rising atmospheric GHG concentrations.443
This must be squared with the negotiating posture of the developing
world, which firmly places economic development and the alleviation of
poverty as top priorities.444 As Athanasiou points out, developing
economies would need to reach the peak of their carbon emissions by
2020 in order to achieve even a middle estimate of global climate safety,
meaning that such carbon emissions would have to peak while the
majority of the people in developing economies are still relatively quite
poor.445 To state it plainly, rich countries are going to have to provide the
technology and finances needed to develop post-GHG economies.446
When addressing equity issues and climate change, it is important

438

See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 36.
Buchner & Carraro, supra note 432, at 17.
440
THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 102.
441
Carraro & Egenhofer, supra note 432, at 120.
442
Tom Athanasiou, After the Denial, 15 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL‟Y 23
(2009).
443
Id. at 26-27.
444
Id. at 27.
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Id. at 28.
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Id. at 31.
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not to get lost in discussions of distributive justice. As Eric Posner and
Cass Sunstein point out, emissions reductions on the part of wealthy
states are not the most effective method for transferring resources or
evening out wealth disparities.447 Furthermore, “the climate change
problem poorly fits the corrective justice model, because the
consequence of tort-like thinking would be to force many people who
have not acted wrongfully to provide a remedy to many people who have
not been victimized.”448 Rather, practical analysis of the tools currently
used by countries to address climate change is required to progress
beyond current stalemates in the multilateral climate regulatory structure.
It is increasingly clear that multilateral climate negotiations are not
having a significant enough impact on global climate-change mitigation
and adaptation issues. One estimate finds that full compliance with the
Kyoto Protocol would reduce global warming by a paltry 0.03º C by
2100.449 The UNFCCC‟s failure to institute explicit abatement targets for
the primary developing country emitters of GHGs has severely
compromised the environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol.450 It
is not economically rational to expect the United States, despite its
undeniable responsibility for current GHG atmospheric concentrations,
to shoulder as much as eighty percent of the costs of an ultimately
ineffective multilateral agreement.451 The two states most criticized for
their failure to implement substantive GHG reduction targets are also the
two states that emit the most GHGs: the United States and China.452 This
is no coincidence, as these two states are motivated by strong national
incentives to free-ride and set unilateral environmental policy rather than
participate in multilateral negotiations, making their refusal to adopt
binding emissions targets economically rational.453 Fragmentation in
447
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 72, at 1590-91; Posner and Sunstein admit, however, that
“desirable redistribution is more likely to occur through climate change policy than otherwise, or to
be accomplished more effectively through climate policy than through direct foreign aid.” Id. at
1591.
448
Id. at 1592.
449
Id. at 1575 (citing WILLIAM NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BONER, WARMING THE WORLD 91, 152
(2000)).
450
Buchner & Carraro, supra note 431, at 16.
451
See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 72, at 1611.
452
The World‟s 12 Largest GHG Emitters, CBC News (Dec. 24, 200), available at
www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/12/14/f-climate-dirty-dozen.html. China leads the world‟s GHG
production with about 7,500 million metric tonnes of GHG emissions per year. The United States
follows closely behind with just over 7,000 million metric tonnes. Id.
453
Barbara Buchner & Carlo Carraro, Regional and Sub-Global Climate Blocs: A CostBenefit Analysis of Bottom-Up Climate Regimes, in CLIMATE AND TRADE POLICY: BOTTOM-UP
APPROACHES TOWARD GLOBAL AGREEMENT 16, 28 (Carlo Carraro & Christian Egenhofer eds.,
2007).
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global climate governance is furthered as well by the fact that the EU and
Japan have strong incentives to keep the United States out of the demand
side of the market, because participation by the United States would
increase EU abatement costs.454 Finally, current large permit suppliers
like Russia have strong incentives to keep potential competitors, such as
China, out of the climate coalition for as long as possible.455 Buchner and
Carraro conclude that the current climate coalition structure involving
cooperation between the European Union, Japan, and Russia is stable in
terms of its economic incentives, though ineffective at actually reducing
global GHG concentrations.456 If multilateral climate negotiations
continue along similar lines, which they give every indication of doing,
and assuming that there will be continued increases in political pressure
on governments to take substantive action, alternative climate change
mitigation strategies must be investigated.
As global climate governance moves forward in the face of such
intransigent forces, international actors will begin to focus more and
more on strategies that can be effective at motivating cooperation from
rational free-riders and other nonparticipants. Initially, GHG reduction
schemes were instituted in the hope that other countries would soon
follow with similar policies. In the absence of such action, GHG
regulators are turning to import-restrictive measures as a means to
balance competitiveness and leakage concerns.457 In 2006 the French
Prime Minister proposed the imposition of taxes on imports from
countries that had not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and in 2008 the
President of the European Commission proposed that importers be
required to obtain GHG allowances as required of European producers.458
BTA provisions in proposed climate legislation in the United States,
discussed previously, are another example of unilateral action to require
importers to participate in domestic GHG regulation.
This more individualized and fragmented approach to global climate
governance, which is fast becoming the norm, demands attention as a
viable and helpful alternative to unpopular hierarchical power structures
and overarching bureaucracies. Noriko Fujiwara and Christian Egenhofer
conclude that “[t]he best we can expect from international negotiations
would be policy coordination, not regulatory approximation.”459 As
454

Id.
Id. at 28-29.
456
Id. at 29.
457
Veel, supra note 32, at 758.
458
Id. at 759.
459
Noriko Fujiwara & Christian Egenhofer, Do Regional Integration Approaches Hold
Lessons for Climate Change Regime Formation? The Case of Differentiated Integration in Europe,
455
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Christina Voigt points out, “fragmented normative structures” are not
automatically indicative of failure in the arena of international law.460
Therefore, bottom-up strategies such as regional agreements and
domestic measures aimed at inducing international cooperation with
unilateral emissions targets may represent the means to shore up
crumbling top-down climate-governance frameworks; to those who
believe the UNFCCC process is too slow, bottom-up methods represent
viable alternatives to such frameworks. Buchner and Carraro conclude
that “parallel bottom-up coalitions could be a first step toward global
climate change control.”461 Indeed, others have noted that integrating
climate, economic, energy, and security policies into regional agreements
represents an increasing trend, especially in action taken by the European
Commission.462 At the very least, regional climate negotiations can have
a much bigger impact than global negotiations on the practical
implementation of global climate goals.463
There are a number of potential positive impacts that BTAs could
have on global climate governance, especially from the perspective of
bottom-up climate regimes. BTAs would reduce the resistance of
domestic industry to GHG regulation, allowing such regulation to be
both stronger and more effectively enforced. By evening out import
disparities, BTAs could also reduce the danger of carbon leakage.
Additionally, the possibility of negotiated agreements with foreign states
to mutually reduce GHG emissions would be enhanced by the addition of
the carrot of BTA reductions (or the stick of BTAs remaining in
place).464 The World Bank conservatively estimates that such BTAs
“could result in a loss of about 7 percent in U.S. exports to the EU. The
energy-intensive industries such as steel and cement, which are the most
likely to be subject to these provisions and thus would be most affected,
could suffer up to a 30 percent loss.”465 These kinds of trade impacts
represent powerful incentives for free-riders to get on board with GHG
reduction targets.
In the first section of this analysis, I detailed three primary

in CLIMATE AND TRADE POLICY: BOTTOM-UP APPROACHES TOWARD GLOBAL AGREEMENT 42, 62
(Carlo Carraro & Christian Egenhofer eds., 2007).
460
VOIGT, supra note 90, at 196.
461
Buchner & Carraro, supra note 43, 1, at 31.
462
Fujiwara & Egenhofer, supra note 459, at 43.
463
“EU approaches are likely to remain tailor-made and differentiated with some adjustments
on a case-by-case basis. Sub-global arrangements such as PCAs should therefore be used to widen
the scope for possible trade-offs and facilitate issue linkages with climate change.” Id. at 61.
464
See Hawkins, supra note 33, at 429.
465
THE WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 12.
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objections to the use of BTAs for GHG regulation: (1) the need to
conform with WTO rules; (2) the difficulty of designing efficient
methodologies; and (3) the fact that BTAs are unilateral measures
representing protectionist trade policies, and as such are destructive to
coalition based solutions to global warming. These objections have, I
hope, been adequately addressed above. But I will attempt a concise
summary in the following paragraphs.
1. BTAs have been used since the inception of GATT and will
continue to be used to further a wide variety of policy goals well into the
future. As detailed in the preceding sections, the intricacies of specific
BTAs for GHG-based taxes and regulations have yet to become totally
clear. But after parsing through much of the regulatory theory, case law,
and international treaties that could impact the legality of such BTAs
under the WTO, it seems clear that both the will and the means exist to
institute such measures. Perhaps the better question is not whether a
GHG-based BTA will be instituted, but how it can be designed so as to
avoid numerous pitfalls.
2. Ismer and Neuhoff‟s proposed model, as well as the other
suggestions in Section III, presents a wide range of potential solutions to
the second problem. Methodologies reliant on predominant product
production processes and average GHG emissions seem equipped to
cope with the unique complexities of product GHG quotients. There is
ample flexibility under GATT to allow the use of estimates of the GHG
content of individual classifications of products without running afoul of
GATT anti-discrimination provisions.
3. Environmentalism as a political ideology is more powerful today
than ever before, and it has the potential to offset traditional game-theory
cost/benefit thinking among consumers. If incentives were more
balanced, consumers would tend to choose based on perceived
environmental benefit. This may suggest inflated efficacy for BTA
measures that level the playing field for domestic, low-carbon industry.
Finally, BTAs present the means to bring non-compliant states into
line with larger market actors, especially in the context of international
negotiation theory and the example of the Montreal Protocol. From this
angle, GHG-based BTAs would be used to impact the public-policy
choices of other states, along the same lines as the measure at issue in
Shrimp—Turtle. To that end, it is vital that issues like carbon leakage,
political impacts, wealth distribution, and developing economy
incentives to participate in a low-GHG world economy remain the
central components of domestic GHG-reduction measures.
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